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Abstract
Despite many decades of research, the management of errors in a live operating system
remains a challenging problem. This thesis presents CuriOS, an operating system that
incorporates several new error management techniques that significantly improve reliabil-
ity. Errors detected by both hardware and software are signaled using language exception
handling mechanisms. Unhandled exceptions do not crash the operating system and are
dispatched to recovery routines.
The architecture of CuriOS is influenced by microkernel design principles. Individual
operating system services are assigned separate protection domains. This componentiza-
tion provided by traditional microkernel designs helps confine errors. However, an error
that occurs in a microkernel operating system service can potentially result in state corrup-
tion and service failure. A simple restart of the failed service is not always the best solution
for reliability. Blindly restarting a service which maintains client-related state such as ses-
sion information results in the loss of this state and affects all clients that were using the
service. CuriOS adopts a novel design that uses lightweight distribution, isolation and per-
sistence of client-related state information maintained by operating system services. This
helps mitigate the problem of state loss during a restart. This design also achieves inter-
client isolation by curtailing error propagation within services.
Fault injection experiments show that it is possible to recover from 87% or more man-
ifested errors in operating system services such as the file system, timer, scheduler and
network while maintaining low performance overheads.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Operating system reliability remains a challenging problem today [1] despite several decades
of research [2, 3, 4, 5]. Errors caused by hardware and software faults are a major factor
affecting operating system reliability. Hardware faults can arise due to various factors,
some of which are aging, temperature, firmware faults, and radiation-induced bit-flips in
memory and registers (Single Event Upsets [6]). Software faults (bugs) due to incorrect
code are also very common in large and complex operating systems [7].
Errors in a monolithic operating system can easily propagate and corrupt other parts of
the system [8, 9], making recovery extremely difficult. Microkernel designs componentize
the operating system into servers managed by a minimal kernel. These servers provide
services such as the file system, networking and timers. User applications and other op-
erating system components are modeled as clients of these servers. Inter-component error
propagation is significantly reduced because, in many microkernel designs, servers usually
execute in their own restricted address space similar to user processes [10, 11].
This thesis introduces CuriOS: a microkernel operating system that incorporates several
effective error detection and recovery techniques in order to attain high reliability. CuriOS
is written in C++ and is based on the Choices object-oriented operating system [12]. It is
constructed as a collection of objects representing various operating system components.
Several operating system services are encapsulated in special objects, each of which exe-
cutes in its own restricted address space.
Errors are detected using a combination of techniques. The hardware virtual memory
protection system detects invalid memory accesses. Consistency and integrity checks help
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detect memory corruption and hardware watchdog timers are used to detect lockup errors.
When errors are detected, CuriOS uses the C++ exception handling support as the signaling
framework to notify recovery routines written as exception handlers. Language exceptions
are automatically created for processor or other hardware exceptions and are dispatched in
a manner similar to programatically raised software exceptions. This allows for a unified
approach to error management.
Recovery from a microkernel server failure is typically attempted by restarting it. The
intuition behind this approach is that reinitializing data structures from scratch by restart-
ing a server usually fixes a transient fault. This is similar to microrebooting [13]. In
Minix3 [10], for example, server restarts are performed by the Reincarnation Server [1].
If the server managing a printer crashes, it causes a temporary unavailability of the printer
until it is restarted. Unfortunately, this approach to recovery does not always work. Many
operating system services maintain state related to clients. In such cases, a server restart
results in the loss of this state information and affects all clients that depend on the server.
For example, a failure of the file system server in Minix3 impacts all clients that were us-
ing the file system. Simply restarting the file system server does not prevent errors from
occurring in these existing clients. Reads and writes to existing open files cannot be com-
pleted because the restarted server cannot recognize the file handles that are presented to
it. A similar problem exists with the network server. Thus, while stateless servers (which
usually encapsulate device drivers) can be restarted to recover the system, this technique
is not applicable for many important operating system services that manage client-related
state.
The state loss problem may be addressed by making clients aware of operating system
service restarts and incorporating recovery actions in the clients. This can result in in-
creased code complexity. Another possible solution is to provide some form of persistence
to the server’s client-related state information. This allows a restarted server to continue
processing requests from existing clients. Some microkernel operating systems like Cho-
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rus and Minix3 support the ability to persist state in memory through restarts; but they do
not use this functionality for operating system servers and, currently, only provide it as a
service for user applications or device drivers.
Attempts to solve the state loss problem by simply persisting server state across a restart
do not address the possible corruption of this state due to error propagation. An error that
occurs in an operating system server, like a typical software error, can potentially corrupt
any part of its state [14] before being detected. This highlights yet another significant lim-
itation of traditional microkernel systems. While such systems minimize inter-component
error propagation, nothing prevents intra-component error propagation.
Checkpointing operating system service state in order to mitigate the effects of error
propagation is not a viable solution because rolling back to a consistent system state re-
quires checkpointing of client state as well. Additionally, multiple checkpoints may have
to be maintained in order to avoid rolling back to an incorrect state. This may be expensive
in terms of memory and performance.
CuriOS significantly minimizes error propagation between as well as within operating
system services and recovers failed services transparently to clients. We accomplish this by
lightweight distribution, isolation and persistence of client-related state information used
by operating system servers. client-related state is stored in client-associated, but client-
inaccessible memory and servers are only granted access to this information when servicing
a request. Because this state is not associated with the server, it persists after a server
restart. This distribution of state is illustrated in figure 1.1. A server failure that occurs
when servicing a client can only affect that client and the restarted server can continue to
process other requests normally.
Distribution of state information from servers to clients for fault tolerance is not new.
Researchers have exploited this technique to improve the reliability of file system services
in distributed operating systems such as Sprite [15] and Chorus/MiX [16]. A more widely
known example is Sun’s stateless Network File System (NFS) [17]. But these designs do
3
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Figure 1.1: State distribution
not protect the state information from being manipulated by clients and leads to various
security problems such as those with NFS [18, 19]. Our design supports safe distribution
of state by protecting the state from modification by clients. Our implementation is also
lightweight because we use virtual memory remapping instead of memory copying to grant
access to state. Additionally, we provide a generic framework for implementing distributed
state and recovery for any operating system service, not just the file system.
Our work is complementary to other research in operating system error detection such
as the language-based type-safety techniques used in SafeDrive [20] and software guards
used in the XFI system [21]. Employing such techniques in CuriOS can improve error
detection latency and further reduce error propagation.
The primary contributions of this thesis are:
1. Exploration of an exceptions-based framework for unified error management in an
object-oriented operating system.
2. Integration of techniques for detecting memory access violation errors and lockup
errors with exceptions-based error signaling.
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3. Design, implementation and evaluation of a novel restart-based error recovery scheme
for stateful operating system components.
CuriOS is being developed to provide a highly reliable operating system environment
for mobile devices such as cellular phones powered by an ARM processor. CuriOS cur-
rently runs on hardware development platforms based on the Texas Instruments OMAP [22]
architecture. The OMAP architecture is a system-on-chip design with an ARM processor
core and is marketed for mobile devices. The platform revision that was used for devel-
oping CuriOS is the OMAP1610 H2 board which is based on an ARM926EJ-S processor
core. CuriOS also runs under the QEMU [23] system emulator which emulates the hard-
ware found in the ARM Integrator family [24] of development boards.
This thesis is the culmination of several years of research, which has also resulted in
several publications at various venues [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Revised sections of text
from these publications are used in this thesis. The dependability related terms used in this
thesis conform to the taxonomy suggested by Avizienis et al. [31]. Words that use the font
Class, represent C++ classes.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a detailed study
of several related operating systems that also have reliability as their goal. A summary at
the end of the chapter highlights the properties necessary for transparent operating system
recovery. The architecture of CuriOS is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses the
exceptions-based error signaling support in CuriOS. The various error detection techniques
deployed in CuriOS are described in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the recovery techniques
adopted by CuriOS and presents an analysis of the types of errors that are recoverable.
Chapter 7 includes a detailed description of several operating system services that were
re-written to be restartable. Chapter 8 evaluates CuriOS in terms of its resilience to errors
as well as performance and memory overheads. Many design decisions in CuriOS can be
categorized into software patterns for reliability. A set of such patterns are highlighted
in Chapter 9. While the primary focus of this thesis was on reliability, some of the de-
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sign decisions result in improvements to other dependability aspects. Chapter 10 describes
the security and maintainability benefits of the CuriOS architecture. Chapter 11 catalogs
other related work and Chapter 12 sketches some future directions of this research. Finally,
Chapter 13 summarizes and concludes this thesis. Appendix A provides some background
information about the Choices operating system and Appendix B presents a brief introduc-
tion to the ARM processor architecture.
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Chapter 2
Related Operating Systems
Some microkernel operating systems that are closely related to our work are Minix3 [10],
L4 [11], Chorus [32] and EROS [33]. We evaluate each of these microkernel-based op-
erating systems by manually injecting memory access errors into different services. This
allows us to explore the effect of an operating system error on its reliability. A memory
access error is the typical manifestation of a hardware or software fault in an operating
system [9]. In all our experiments, a memory access error results in the termination of the
operating system server.
Table 2.1 shows the results of our experiments. The immediate effect of encountering
the memory access fault is shown in the third column. The last column shows our analysis
of whether a restarted server will continue serving existing clients correctly (if restartability
support were included in the corresponding operating system). Except for Minix3, which
already implements restartable services, this observation is based on purely source code
analysis. A brief explanation for our conclusion is provided in each row. The entries in the
last column for Minix3 are actual experimental results.
The rest of this chapter discusses reliability aspects of the previously mentioned sys-
tems and several other related operating systems in more detail.
2.1 Minix3
Reliability support in Minix3 is provided by the Reincarnation Server which is able to
restart both failed services and device drivers. Server restarts work well only for device
7
Table 2.1: Recoverability of microkernel operating systems from memory access errors
µkernel Failed Server Immediate Effect After Restart
Minix3
File System (fs) System unusable. × Server is not restarted because
the Reincarnation Server de-
pends on the file system. Also,
all current file system state infor-
mation is lost.
Network (inet) All existing net-
work connections
fail.
× Restart does not help re-establish
connections because state infor-
mation is lost.
Random Num-
bers (random)
Temporary read
failure.
X Once the server is restarted,
client reads begin working again.
Printer Driver
(printer)
Temporary
printer access
failure.
X Print job completes successfully
after spooler retries request to the
restarted printer server.
L4
Timer (ig timer) System unusable. × All clients stop receiving timer
interrupts. Restart does not help
because clients waiting on inter-
rupts can’t re-register.
Name Server
(ig naming)
No immediate ef-
fect.
× But many critical services inac-
cessible because lookup of regis-
tered names fail. Restart does not
help because all registered clients
need to re-register.
Serial (ig serial) Serial port inac-
cessible.
X Request retries will eventually
work.
Chorus
File System (vfs) System unusable. × Restart does not help because file
system state information is lost.
Network (netinet) System unusable. × Restart does not help recover ex-
isting network connections.
Timer (kern) System unusable. × Restart does not address clients
waiting on timeout.
EROS
Memory allocator
(spacebank)
System unusable. X Restore from a previous check-
point may fix this error.
Process Creator System can-
not create new
processes.
X Restore from a previous check-
point may fix this error.
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drivers [1, 34]. This is substantiated by our experiments (Table 2.1). In our experiments,
the file system server crashes on all invalid memory accesses and results in an unusable
system. Even if the file system server were restarted correctly, existing open files would
be inaccessible because of the lost server state. Based on this information, we believe that
the Minix3 file system server could be less reliable than the file system in a monolithic
operating system such as Linux. This is because a virtual memory error that occurs in
Linux file system code only results in the termination of the thread that encountered the
error and does not always result in an unusable system.
Minix3 includes a data store server that can be used to store state that persists after a
failure induced restart. The Minix3 data store provides some protection from errors in a
server because it resides in a separate address space from the server. It has been used to
implement failure resilience for device drivers [35]. A drawback of the data store approach
is the additional communication and data copying overhead involved. This approach also
does not restrict intra-component error propagation.
2.2 L4/Iguana
Iguana [36] is a suite of operating system services that are implemented for the L4 mi-
crokernel [11]. This comprises basic operating system services such as naming, memory
management, timer and some device drivers. Our experiments study the behavior of some
Iguana services when they encounter memory errors. Unlike Minix3, there isn’t any sup-
port for restartable services. An analysis of the source code shows that server restartability,
if implemented, still does not solve the problem of preventing the corruption of state and
recovering it. As an example, the Iguana timer service maintains information about clients
to which it periodically sends messages. This information will be irrecoverably lost upon
a restart. A stateless server like the serial driver, on the other hand, can be restarted and
may continue to work for existing clients. More complex functionality such as a file sys-
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tem is part of the L4Linux [37] suite, which implements a complete Linux system as a
user-mode server. Since most of the functionality required by Linux applications is imple-
mented in this server, the reliability of all L4Linux applications depends on the reliability
of this server, which in turn is not any more reliable than the normal monolithic Linux
operating system. This has been improved to some extent by isolating device drivers in
separate virtual L4Linux servers [38].
2.3 Chorus
The Chorus operating system [32] is designed for high reliability and is used in several
telecommunication systems. In contrast to Minix3 and L4, services are executed in priv-
ileged mode and share the same address space as the microkernel. Chorus includes “Hot
Restart” technology [39] that allows servers to maintain state in persistent memory and
resume execution quickly after a failure. Unlike both the design we use in CuriOS and the
Minix3 data store, all allocated persistent memory in Chorus is permanently mapped into
the server domain. There is no mechanism in place that prevents state information saved
in the allocated persistent memory from being potentially corrupted by an error that occurs
in a server. Unfortunately, Chorus’ operating system services do not take advantage of the
“Hot Restart” functionality.
2.4 EROS
EROS [33] is a capability-based system which saves periodic snapshots of the entire ma-
chine state to disk. When the system recovers after a crash, the last written snapshot is
reloaded. This approach only works when the error is not present in the snapshot. Though
the system performs some consistency checks on snapshots, correctness cannot be assured
and several previous snapshots may have to be reloaded before a working version is ob-
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tained. Minix3’s approach of restarting an erroneous server results in a re-creation of all
internal state and has better chances of eliminating errors. Another drawback is that snap-
shots of large systems and device state (not currently performed by EROS) can be expensive
in terms of memory and performance. Reverting to a previous system snapshot on a failure
also results in a loss of all work done since the snapshot. This may be undesirable in some
situations. For example all user input since the last snapshot is lost.
2.5 Others
The Exokernel operating system architecture [40] places most operating system abstrac-
tions in an application library and securely multiplexes machine resources. Similar to a
monolithic kernel, error propagation is possible throughout the library operating system
and the application. There is no mechanism that provides transparent recovery for an
application when errors occur in the associated library operating system. An important
advantage of the exokernel approach is that errors only affect the process in which they
occur. This benefit is at the cost of a complex design for multiplexing shared resources
like the storage subsystem. Four design iterations were required to build the XN storage
system [41]. The Nemesis OS [42] also adopted a vertical structure similar to the ex-
okernel architecture while providing explicit low-level guarantees for reserved resources.
Error propagation was limited by enforcing isolation between device driver, system and
application domains. The design of Nemesis was driven by QoS considerations and not
surprisingly, does not include recovery support for arbitrary errors in components. How-
ever, Nemesis provides QoS isolation between the clients of a system service. Services are
designed to prevent one client from adversely affecting the QoS observed by others.
The Singularity system [43] adopts a radically different approach to security and relia-
bility by using software enforcement of address spaces. CuriOS relies on hardware support
to enforce memory protection.
11
2.6 Summary
From our study of the operating systems presented in this chapter, we are able to make
several observations about how the design of an operating system can impact its ability to
transparently recover in the event of the failure and restart of an operating system service.
Transparency of addressing: Clients should be able to use the same address to access
the operating system service after it is restarted. In EROS, since the whole system is re-
stored to a previous checkpoint, this property is true. This is not supported by Chorus,
whose hot restart algorithm restarts servers with a new address. Nor is this supported by
L4 or Minix3 since a restarted server would be assigned a different address. A name server
can be used to ameliorate this problem by maintaining a consistent name for the server
across a restart. The restarted server would register its new address with the name server to
provide continued availability.
Minix3 achieves transparency of addressing to some degree by using the file system
server as a name server. A server can register itself as the handler for a device entry on the
file system. For instance the Minix3 random server mentioned in table 2.1 handles requests
for the /dev/random file system node. In our experiment, we opened /dev/random
using the open system call and then proceeded to read a stream of data from the server.
When the server crashed, reads using the file handle we obtained when the device was orig-
inally opened failed; however, once the server was restarted, reads using the same handle
began to work once again.
Suspension of clients for duration of recovery: Clients should not time out or initiate
new requests during the recovery phase. This property is supported by Chorus. In Minix3,
clients are allowed to run when the server is restarting, and this results in errors when a
client attempts to communicate with it. This is also the case in L4; the client will receive
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an error when it tries to communicate with a server that may be restarting. The whole
system is restored to a previous checkpoint in EROS and therefore, this property is not
applicable.
Persistence of client-related state: When a service is restarted, requests from clients must
not fail because the server lost client-related state. Client-related state must be preserved
and made available to the restarted server. Chorus and Minix3 have some support for in-
memory state preservation, but this is not exploited by any of the operating system services
they support. An alternative is to save this information to stable storage. In EROS, all
computation since the last saved checkpoint is lost.
Isolation of client-related state: Designs of existing microkernel operating systems pro-
vide unrestricted access to client-related state within a server. An error that occurs in
the server can potentially corrupt state related to all clients. This intra-component error
propagation problem exists in a large number of important microkernel operating system
services. In EROS, error propagation may lead to inconsistent data being checkpointed.
The design of CuriOS achieves all of the above goals in order to provide transparent
recovery of the operating system to applications. Address transparency is achieved by in-
place restarts. All client requests are blocked until recovery is completed. Persistence and
isolation of client-related state is achieved through distribution and memory protection.
This also reduces intra-component error propagation.
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Chapter 3
CuriOS Architecture
CuriOS is written in C++ and uses object-oriented techniques throughout its design. It
is based on the Choices operating system [12] and inherits many aspects of its software
architecture. Unlike Choices which is built as a modular monolithic kernel, CuriOS adopts
microkernel design principles for reliability.
This chapter only presents the features of CuriOS that are relevant to this thesis. A
comprehensive list of additional features is available as part of the description of Choices
in Appendix A.
3.1 Organization
CuriOS is structured as a collection of interacting objects that represent various components
and services. An object can be confined to an isolated memory protection domain in order
to limit error propagation. We refer to such an object as a protected object. Protected
objects work together with a small kernel, known as CuiK, in order to provide standard
operating system services as shown in figure 3.1.
CuiK is a thin layer of the operating system that mediates the interaction between the
rest of the system and the hardware. It runs with the highest privileges and works as the
“microkernel” for CuriOS. CuiK is composed of a small set of objects that manage low-
level architecture specific functionality such as processor configuration, interrupt dispatch-
ing and context switching. All communication between applications and protected objects
is managed by CuiK.
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Figure 3.1: CuriOS organization
3.2 Protected Objects
A protected object is the mechanism that provides isolation for operating system compo-
nents in CuriOS. All methods on a protected object are executed with reduced privileges
and run with hardware enforced memory protection. CuriOS applies the principle of least
privilege to protected objects and only grants them access to memory regions that are re-
quired for correct operation. This prevents an error that occurs while running code in a
protected object from corrupting other parts of the system by overwriting memory outside
of the protected object.
A protected object in CuriOS is analogous to a “server” in a traditional microkernel sys-
tem. Thus, operating system servers in CuriOS are implemented using protected objects.
Clients are either user applications or other protected objects.
Our implementation of protected objects on the ARM platform enforces restrictions
on memory access and completely disallows execution of privileged processor instruc-
tions. Nevertheless, because hardware devices on ARM platforms are controlled through
memory-mapped registers, they can be made accessible from within protected objects in or-
der to encapsulate device drivers. Implementations of protected objects on other platforms
such as the x86 can additionally exploit architectural features to provide fine-grained access
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Figure 3.2: Protected method call
control for other resources such as I/O ports.
Our usage of the term protected object should not be confused with the usage of this
term in Ada. In Ada, a protected object refers to data objects which are protected by mutual
exclusion [44].
Protected method calls are used to invoke operations on protected objects. This is il-
lustrated in figure 3.2. Each protected object is assigned a private heap. A private stack
is reserved for every thread that accesses the protected object. This stack is allocated at
the first invocation of a protected method, contributing to a small delay in processing the
first call to a protected object. Subsequent invocations of protected methods on the same
protected object by the same thread reuse this stack and are therefore much faster. A pro-
tected method call results in a switch to a reduced privilege execution mode and constrained
access rights to memory. The private stack and the heap are mapped in with read-write priv-
ileges. The rest of CuriOS is mapped in with read-only privileges. Permissions to write to
any additional memory has to be explicitly granted by CuiK.
Protected objects are implemented using a wrapper object that intercepts method calls
to a protected object and manages memory access control, processor mode switching and
recovery. Figure 3.3 shows pseudo code for this implementation. The ExampleWrapper
class implements protected object functionality for the Example class. The C++ inher-
itance based construction allows the use of ExampleWrapper objects as drop-in re-
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class Example {
public:
void runExample() {
// Code executed in protected object context
}
};
class ExampleWrapper: public Example {
public:
void runExample() {
switchStack();
switchHeap();
dropPrivilegeLevel();
try {
Example::runExample();
} catch (Exception e) {
// Perform recovery actions
}
elevatePrivilegeLevel();
restoreHeap();
restoreStack();
}
};
Figure 3.3: Pseudo code for the protected object implementation
placements for Example objects. The example shown illustrates a simple case where the
protected method call has no arguments or return values. If arguments are present, they are
passed through to the base class method. If the protected object’s method returns a value,
it is saved in the wrapper and returned to the calling method. The invocation of the method
inside the protected object is enclosed in an exception handling block. If an exception is
raised while executing the protected method call, it is intercepted at this point and recovery
code is invoked. The recovery process is described in Chapter 6.
Wrapper classes also inherit from a common base class that provides the support func-
tions used to switch protection domains and manage private heaps and stacks. While it is
used in the actual CuriOS code, this multiple inheritance is not depicted in figure 3.3.
Every CuriOS thread has an associated memory allocator and uses it for any memory
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allocation requests. Normally, all kernel threads would share the same memory allocator
for the global kernel heap. The private protected object heap is implemented by temporarily
changing the allocator for the thread executing the protected method call. The old allocator
for the thread is restored in the wrapper when the protected method call completes.
The protected object wrapper tracks all protected method calls made by a thread by
maintaining a stack of activation records for that thread. It uses this information to identify
recursive or multiple calls into the same protected object. This is necessary in order to
identify the correct stack pointer that should be assigned at any particular protected method
call invocation. This is important because only one stack in the protected object is allocated
per-thread and all recursive invocations need to reuse the same stack.
The combination of protected objects and CuiK results in a single address space oper-
ating system [45, 46], where virtual addresses are identical across various components, but
access permissions differ. This design is beneficial in several ways. Pointers are always
valid across operating system components and can be easily transferred between them.
This minimizes data copying overheads. When switching between components with dif-
ferent access permissions, only the TLB (which maintains access permissions) needs to be
flushed; virtually tagged caches do not have to be cleaned and flushed because contents
remain valid across the protection boundaries.
3.3 Thread Model
Threads in CuriOS are managed by CuiK. Using defined interfaces, a thread executing in
CuriOS can cross application, kernel, and protected object boundaries. For example, a
system call from an application causes the thread to cross from user space into the CuiK
kernel. This same thread can cross from CuiK into a protected object using a protected
method call. Some example threads are illustrated in figure 3.4. This is reminiscent of the
design of Brevix [47] and that of Clouds [48].
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CuriOS servers can be multi-threaded and our current implementation shares the same
virtual memory mappings for all threads that execute within a protected object. An exten-
sion of this model to provide thread-private memory could provide additional protection
against errors. This direction requires further study and investigation.
3.4 Error Management
The management of errors in an operating system comprises error detection, error signaling
and error recovery. CuriOS sports innovations in all three areas.
Error detection is the first step towards ensuring correct system operation in the pres-
ence of faults. In software systems, it is extremely important to detect errors quickly and
respond with appropriate recovery actions before they cause cascading data corruption and
make recovery more difficult. The time between the occurrence of an error and its detection
is referred to as the error latency. Reducing error latency helps reduce error propagation.
The errors detected by CuriOS are described in detail in Chapter 5.
C++ exception handling is used as the error signaling mechanism in CuriOS [25] and
is discussed in Chapter 4. Exceptions are raised for both processor signaled errors such
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as invalid memory accesses and for externally signaled errors such as operating system
infinite loop lockups (signaled by a watchdog timer) [28].
CuriOS restarts components that encounter errors in order to avoid complete system
failure. This error recovery mechanism and the associated state management support for
restarting stateful components are covered in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Error Signaling
Exceptions are events that disrupt the normal execution flow of a program. Languages like
Java and C++ provide constructs for programmers to write code to both generate exceptions
and handle them. In C++, an exception is generated using the throw keyword. The
catch keyword is used to define a code block that handles exceptions.
Exceptions have several advantages [49] over traditional mechanisms for conveying
errors. The use of exception handling allows software developers to avoid return value
overloading and clearly separate error handling code from regular code. Using error codes
to signal error conditions requires either ugly global variables or propagation of the codes
through the call stack, sometimes through methods that do not care about them. Excep-
tions, on the other hand, are directly dispatched to methods that have handler code. When
exceptions are expressed using objects, class hierarchies can be used to classify and group
error conditions.
In CuriOS, exceptions are generated for errors detected by both hardware and software.
This use of language exceptions to represent arbitrary error conditions results in a uni-
form framework for managing operating system errors. This empowers developers to use
C++ catch statements to handle both normally thrown exceptions as well as special error
conditions such as bad memory accesses.
While exceptions can be raised for many unexpected conditions in order to attempt re-
covery, it may be necessary to halt the system in some rare cases where the programmer has
determined that recovery may be impossible. For such cases, CuriOS provides a method
that stops all computation.
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Figure 4.1: Terminology
4.1 Creating C++ Exceptions from Processor Exceptions
In this section, we describe the process by which errors signaled by the processor are
converted to C++ language exceptions. Before we delve into details, it is important to
understand the various sources of processor interrupts. As shown in figure 4.1, processor
interrupts can arise from both hardware and software sources. Peripheral devices can use
hardware interrupts to communicate asynchronous events to the processor. For instance, a
serial port may interrupt the processor to indicate it has received data.
In addition to hardware sources of interrupts, the software running on a processor may
also directly cause an interrupt. Software sources of interrupts can be classified into two
categories. Processors generally provide a means for invoking an interrupt via the instruc-
tion set. The x86 architecture provides the INT instruction, and the ARM architecture
provides the SWI instruction. This mechanism is used to implement system calls. The
other category is processor exceptions. A processor exception indicates that some sort of
“exceptional” event has occurred during execution. There are many causes of processor
exceptions, and possible processor exceptions vary between architectures. Example pro-
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class Interrupt {
public:
virtual void raise() = 0;
};
class InterruptManager {
public:
Interrupt *setInterrupt(int number, Interrupt *);
Interrupt *getInterrupt(int number);
void dispatchInterrupt(int number, Context *context);
void interruptReceived(Context *context);
void interruptReceived(int number, Context *context);
virtual void enableInterrupts() = 0;
virtual void disableInterrupts() = 0;
virtual void enableInterrupt(int number) = 0;
virtual void disableInterrupt(int number) = 0;
protected:
virtual int getInterruptNumber() = 0;
virtual void ackInterrupt(int number) = 0;
Interrupt **interrupts;
};
Figure 4.2: Interrupt management interfaces in CuriOS
cessor exceptions include division by zero, execution of an undefined instruction, and page
faults. It is important to note that not all processor exceptions indicate errors. For instance,
page faults are usually handled by the operating system and only result in an error if the
faulting process has no valid mapping for the requested page.
Interrupts in CuriOS are supervised by an InterruptManager object. This ob-
ject manages subsystem initialization, interrupt handler registration and interrupt dispatch.
Hardware interrupts, software interrupts and processor exceptions are all dispatched using
the same interface. Processor interrupts are first delivered to the InterruptManager.
The InterruptManager then dispatches the interrupt to a pre-registered handler. The
InterruptManager is a machine independent abstract C++ class and its interface is
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void throwException() {
// Throw saved exception object
throw thisProcess()->getException();
}
Figure 4.3: Code for the function that throws the exception
shown in figure 4.2. It only includes code for handler registration and dispatch, and it
delegates hardware initialization and interrupt number lookup to machine specific sub-
classes. Interrupt handlers are created as instances of classes derived from the Interrupt
base class which exports an abstract raise() method. The dispatchInterrupt()
method in InterruptManager looks up the handler for the current interrupt and in-
vokes the raise() method.
CuriOS registers special handlers with the InterruptManager for all processor
exceptions like invalid instructions or memory access errors that require the generation of
language exceptions. When the processor is handling an interrupt, the context of the in-
terrupted process is available in a Context object associated with the Process. If the
interrupt is due to a processor exception that signals an error, the registered special han-
dler is invoked. The handler creates an appropriate Exception object and associates it
with the Process object representing the currently running process. The Exception
object includes a saved copy of the current context and a stack backtrace. This infor-
mation is useful for debugging. The handler then updates the program counter (PC) in
the Context of the interrupted process to point to a function that throws the exception
(throwException() in figure 4.3). The special processor exception handler now re-
turns, and the context of the interrupted process (with the modified PC) is restored to the
processor. This causes the process to immediately start executing throwException().
The code in throwException() extracts the saved exception from the Process
object and raises the exception using the normal C++ throw syntax. Thus, it appears as
if the process called a function throwing a C++ exception at the exact instruction address
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Figure 4.4: Processor exception control flow
where it encountered a processor exception. Figure 4.4 illustrates the flow of control in the
interrupt handler for a processor exception. This implementation enables the conversion of
processor exceptions to C++ language exceptions.
Another implementation option that was considered was directly modifying the proces-
sor exception causing instruction and replacing it with a call to throwException().
The idea was to execute the calling instruction on returning from the interrupt handler. On
processors with separate instruction and data caches, this technique would require a cache
flush in order to ensure that the modified instruction is correctly fetched when execution
is resumed. But this design is not safe when there are multiple processes that share the
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Figure 4.5: Processor exception classes
same code. This implementation was therefore discarded in favor of the PC modifying
technique.
Since processor exceptions may occur anywhere in the code, the stack unwinding li-
braries must be prepared to handle exceptions within any context. This functionality is
enabled by a special GNU g++ compiler flag, “-fnon-call-exceptions”. Without the use of
this flag, only explicitly thrown exceptions are handled. This option is typically used to
compile user application code that attempts to throw exceptions from signal handlers. In
the kernel, this allows an exception to be correctly dispatched even in the absence of an
explicit throw call.
Unlike x86 processors, which support a large set of processor exceptions such as divide-
by-zero, protection faults, device unavailable, invalid opcode, alignment checks and so
on, ARM processors only classify processor exceptions into three basic types. The C++
exception class hierarchy in CuriOS for the ARM processor is shown in figure 4.5. An
ARMDataAccessException is thrown when the processor encounters an error while
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trying to fetch data. This is the result of a page fault when virtual memory is enabled.
An ARMInstructionAccessException is thrown when the processor encounters
an error while trying to fetch an instruction. This is also called a prefetch abort. An
ARMUndefinedInstructionException is thrown when the instruction is invalid.
This is equivalent to the Invalid OpCode exception for x86. All processor exceptions are
derived from an abstract base class called ProcessorException. This base class de-
clares abstract methods used to access the context and stack trace of processor-specific
exceptions. These are implemented by processor-specific subclasses. This classification
allows processor-specific code to respond differently to different types of exceptions. The
use of the abstract base class allows machine and processor independent code to catch all
processor exceptions independent of the architecture and handle them using generic mech-
anisms.
4.2 Cross Domain Exceptions
An exception can propagate normally within a single protection domain. However, extra
support is required to allow an exception to traverse the multiple domains created by the
protected objects in CuriOS. This is necessary because threads in CuriOS cross protected
object boundaries which use private stacks and the C++ exception dispatch libraries only
expect a single function call stack.
In order to support exceptions that need to propagate across domains, the wrappers that
implement protected objects catch all exceptions in the callee domain and re-throw them
in the calling domain. This cross-domain support is used for exceptions that don’t require
the restart-based recovery support. The exception re-throw mechanism is also used when
multiple recovery attempts fail and escalation is required.
Because of the single address space design of CuriOS, objects allocated in the callee
domain are also visible in the calling domain. Thus, an exception created within a protected
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object domain is readable by all other operating system components. There is no need for
copying of exception objects between domains.
Unlike other systems like Java that support cross domain exceptions, there is no need
for serialization or deserialization of the exception objects. There exist no network or
language representation issues that force the need for a serialized representation of objects.
4.3 Undispatchable Exceptions
The C++ language runtime exception handling support can only dispatch an exception
correctly when the register context is not significantly corrupted. In particular, invalid
values in the FP or SP registers that describe the stack cause the exception dispatching
code to fail. In such cases, the language runtime is programmed to invoke an abort routine.
Thus, errors that result in corruption of these registers cannot be immediately signaled
using exceptions.
CuriOS implements a workaround to handle these undispatchable exceptions. The reg-
ister context is saved by the protected object wrapper at every entry point into a protected
object. The abort routine called by the exception dispatching code is programmed to re-
store the previously saved context and re-raise the exception in this context. Because the
restored register context is valid, the exception can now be correctly dispatched down the
remainder of the stack. This process is illustrated in figure 4.6. This approach to dealing
with undispatchable exceptions may possibly result in skipping over several stack frames in
the protected object by the exception handling system. This is clearly illustrated in the fig-
ure. This does not impact recovery significantly because the recovery approach adopted in
CuriOS is a restart of the protected object. The restart is expected to reset most of the state
information that would have normally been cleaned up by the exception dispatch through
the stack frames in the protected object.
28
Error!
Abort Called
Active Frame
Protected
Method Call
Protected
Object Code
Protected
Method Call
Exception
thrown
in restored
context
Exception
propagates
normally 
through
rest of stack
Protected
Method Call
Skipped
Stack Frame
Skipped 
Stack Frame
1 2 3
Figure 4.6: Handling of undispatchable exceptions
4.4 Size and Performance Impact
The size and performance impact of using exceptions depends on the implementation of
exception handling in the C++ compiler. The GNU g++ compiler supports two different
implementations for C++ exceptions. The first implementation is extremely portable [50]
and is based on the setjmp/longjmp (SJLJ) pair of functions. This implements excep-
tions using a setjmp call to save context at C++ try blocks and in all functions with local
objects that need to be destroyed when an exception unwinds stack frames. The longjmp
call is used to restore saved contexts during stack unwinding. Since the context saves are
performed irrespective of whether an exception is eventually raised or not, this implemen-
tation suffers a performance penalty. For example, this penalty is observed when the new
operator is used to allocate memory from the heap. The standard library version of new is
designed to throw a “bad alloc” exception if the allocation fails. This design results in a
context save at the beginning of every memory allocation request. Using SJLJ exceptions
in an operating system also requires special precautions because the implementation uses
state variables that need to be updated when switching contexts.
The DWARF2 [51] debugging information format specification allows for a table-
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Table 4.1: Comparing SJLJ and table-driven implementations of exceptions
Characteristic SJLJ Table-driven
Portability Portable Not portable
Normal execution per-
formance
Affected because of frequent
context saves
Not affected because tables
are computed at compile time
Exception handling
performance
Fast because context restore is
cheap
Slower because of table-based
unwinding
Space overhead Code to save contexts Table entries for unwinding
driven alternative implementation of exceptions that only executes extra code when an
exception is actually thrown. There is no performance overhead during normal execution.
This approach uses a static compiler-generated table which defines actions that need to
be performed when an exception is thrown. Table 4.1 compares these two implementa-
tions. The trade-off in this approach is size for performance. Modern compilers implement
exceptions using the table-driven approach for better performance.
We have studied the exception handling framework under both SJLJ and table-driven
implementations. To test SJLJ exceptions, we build an ARM compiler from the pub-
lished GNU g++ source code and enable SJLJ exceptions as part of the build process.
For table-driven exceptions, we use a version of the GNU g++ compiler published by
Codesourcery [52] that implements table-driven exceptions and also conforms to the ARM
Exception Handling ABI [53]. We use the same version (4.1.0) of both these compilers.
Adding exception handling support results in a larger operating system kernel. Re-
searchers have reported kernel size increases of about 10% when adding exception han-
dling to the Linux kernel [54]. Similar numbers for CuriOS are unavailable because the
GNU g++ compiler does not allow disabling of exception handling support for C++ code.
We performed a comparison study of CuriOS kernels using SJLJ exceptions with ker-
nels using table-driven exceptions. For each of these implementations, we build two ver-
sions of the kernel. One version only supports normal explicitly thrown exceptions. The
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Table 4.2: Section sizes (in bytes) for different exception handling implementations
CuriOS SJLJ Table-driven
ELF section Normal Processor exceptions Normal Processor exceptions
.text 1,252,980 1,296,176 1,063,600 1,066,484
.data 29,056 29,056 28,500 28,500
.bss 297,984 297,984 297,740 297,740
exception data 9,476 10,980 117,364 131,284
everything else 275,868 288,152 272,044 274,512
Total 1,865,364 1,922,348 1,779,248 1,798,520
other version includes support for mapping processor exceptions to language exceptions
by using the “-fnon-call-exceptions” compiler flag. An early version of the CuriOS kernel
source code was used for these experiments. All kernel executables were compiled to the
ELF format. The g++ optimization level was set to 2. We measured the size of the .text
section which holds program instructions, the .data section which holds program data, the
.bss section which holds uninitialized data and the size of the sections holding exception
handling data, such as tables and indices. Table 4.2 shows the results of our measurements.
The sizes are also displayed in graphical form in figure 4.7.
The figure shows that the use of SJLJ exceptions increases the size of the program
text area compared to table-driven exceptions. This is because of the extra instructions for
saving and restoring context that are inserted into all functions that define local objects.
A small portion of the kernel (0.5%) is reserved for data that is used during exception
handling. Adding support for mapping processor exceptions results in just a 3% increase
in the size of the kernel. This increase is due to some extra exception handling code and
data.
The kernel compiled with table-driven exceptions is about 4% smaller in size. There is
a significant reduction in the size of the program text compared to SJLJ exceptions due to
the elimination of extra instructions for saving context. But this reduction in size is offset
by the large number of exception table entries. It is possible to reduce this overhead using
table compression [55]. When processor exceptions support is added, the size of the kernel
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Figure 4.7: Size comparison of CuriOS using different exception handling mechanisms
only increases by 1%.
The performance impact of using exception handling was studied on the Texas Instru-
ments OMAP1610 H2 hardware development kit with the processor clock frequency set
to 96 MHz. The overhead of using a single try block in a function was measured to be 14
nanoseconds for table-driven exceptions. This is less than the time taken to run two hard-
ware instructions on the processor. Thus, table-driven exceptions have no noticeable impact
on performance. For SJLJ exceptions, this overhead was measured to be 833 nanoseconds.
This reflects the significant number of extra instructions that are executed by this imple-
mentation to support exception handling. Because of its low performance overhead, we
use table-driven exceptions by default for CuriOS builds. All experiments described in the
remainder of this thesis use table-driven exceptions.
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Chapter 5
Error Detection
CuriOS includes support for detecting three classes of errors: invalid memory accesses,
memory corruption and lockup errors. This Chapter describes the techniques used to detect
these errors.
The techniques presented in this Chapter are not comprehensive and do not detect all
possible errors. However, we believe that the error detection mechanisms implemented in
CuriOS are a good match for our primary error recovery approach - component restarts, and
are powerful enough to detect a majority of errors. The results of our experiments presented
later in Chapter 8 support our intuition. Nevertheless, the design of CuriOS doesn’t pre-
clude the addition of other error detection methods, if necessary. For example, the addition
of stronger language-based checks as used in SafeDrive [20] or software guards as used in
XFI [21] will significantly reduce error latency and may improve recoverability. Detected
errors are usually translated into exceptions by CuriOS and are raised in the context of the
thread that encountered the error.
5.1 Invalid Memory Access Errors
The memory protection enforced by the hardware on a protected object helps detect any
erroneous computation that leads to incorrect memory accesses outside the protection do-
main. Invalid accesses such as disallowed writes or bad addresses manifest as processor
exceptions and are automatically converted to software exceptions using the technique de-
scribed in Chapter 4. Memory access control also helps constrain error propagation.
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In addition to controlling read and write permissions, some processors also have the
ability to control execute permissions. This support is available in newer ARM processors
and could be used to increase the effectiveness of the protected object mechanism. The
processors in our current platforms do not support this feature.
It is important to realize that the protected object mechanism does not detect cases
where an incorrect memory access occurs within the protected object’s domain. Such errors
may be detected by approaches such as SafeDrive [20] or OKE [56].
5.2 Memory Corruption Errors
Operating system memory corruption may occur due to various factors. Some examples
of faults that cause memory corruption are radiation-induced bit-flips, software bugs and
misbehaving hardware. ECC memory is a widely used defense against flipped memory bits.
Commonly available ECC memory modules are able to detect and correct single bit errors
in memory words. ECC memory, however, does not address corruption caused by incorrect
program execution. These errors may only be detected by checking the consistency or
integrity of memory contents.
5.2.1 Data Consistency Checks
Data consistency checks are a standard approach to dealing with memory corruption er-
rors. We use such checks in the CuriOS code whenever possible. Sanity checking code is
also available in most existing systems and libraries. When adding third-party libraries to
enhance the functionality of CuriOS, such code can be used for error detection. For ex-
ample, when the lwIP networking library was ported to CuriOS, the “assert” code in lwIP
was converted to generate exceptions and signal errors instead of halting execution. For
such purposes, CuriOS provides an AssertOrThrow construct that throws an exception if
the assertion fails.
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An obvious limitation of this approach is that it assumes semantic knowledge about the
data in memory. It, therefore, requires specialized checker routines written by operating
system developers. Nevertheless, the EROS system [33] uses such an approach to verify
the consistency of periodic system-wide checkpoints.
5.2.2 Corrupted Instructions
Transient memory faults such as flipped bits or memory corruption because of faulty code
can cause errors such as invalid instructions in system code. Unlike other types of errors,
corrupted instructions are easy to fix once detected. Recovery simply involves reloading
the instruction from stable storage such as disk or other non-volatile memory such as flash.
In some cases, because of hardware problems, the fault may be permanent and a bit in
the memory word may be stuck at a particular value. These cases may be distinguished by
testing the memory word’s ability to store different bit patterns. It might still be possible to
recover from such permanent faults by remapping the affected hardware page using virtual
memory support.
In CuriOS, if the processor signals an undefined instruction exception, the low-level
processor exception handler reloads the instruction from a copy of the code in memory-
mapped persistent flash storage. When the handler returns, the newly loaded correct in-
struction is executed. This recovery strategy is simple to implement; but, it cannot detect
memory corruption that results in a machine instruction changing to another valid instruc-
tion. Another limitation of this technique is that it cannot be transparently applied to code
that is generated at run-time.
5.2.3 Checksums
Checksums are popularly used to verify data integrity. CuriOS can be configured to com-
pute periodic checksums of memory that is not expected to change, such as kernel code. If
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the checksum changes due to memory corruption, the affected memory block is reloaded
from flash storage. The instruction cache is then flushed to ensure that any corrupted in-
structions in the cache are discarded. Unlike the undefined instruction reload technique,
checksums can detect a valid instruction changing to another valid but incorrect instruc-
tion.
CuriOS does not use exceptions to signal a checksum failure. The checksum routine
directly transfers control to a recovery routine to fix the corrupted memory. This is possible
because unlike other types of error detectors, detection using checksums is asynchronous
and recovery does not require specialized thread-local handlers.
This is a preemptive approach and can detect faults before they cause errors. A code
checksum may also be performed immediately after other types of operating system errors
are detected in order to ensure that system and recovery code is intact. While CuriOS
currently only uses checksums to protect code, this technique may also be used to detect
changes to static data.
The use of checksums to ensure integrity of code or data has several limitations. It is
not feasible to use periodic checksums to protect dynamic data from corruption. Because
these checksums are only performed at preset intervals, the error detection latency is high
and it is possible for an error to propagate and worsen before being detected. Checksums
also incur computational overhead.
Recent ARM based microprocessor designs [57] for mobile devices include Run Time
Integrity Checker (RTIC) hardware which can be configured by the operating system to
periodically compute and verify SHA-1 hashes of specified code sections. If a hash value
changes, it is communicated to the processor through an interrupt. This design significantly
reduces the performance cost of performing periodic checksums as the external hardware
only utilizes the memory bus when it is idle. Our current development platforms do not
include this latest hardware and we are therefore constrained to use checksums performed
by software running on the primary processor.
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5.3 Lockup Errors
Lockup errors are characterized by an unresponsive kernel that is unable to schedule and
run useful code. Some examples of such errors are: infinite-loops, indefinite wait for
non-responsive hardware and deadlock conditions. Lockup errors that occur in user space
programs can be detected by other programs [58, 59], and can be usually handled without
affecting other unrelated programs. On the other hand, lockup errors that occur inside the
operating system can render the computer unusable by not allowing any other programs to
execute. Lockup causing bugs occur often in operating system code. More than 30% of
the bugs in Linux discovered by Chou et al. [7] were bugs that could potentially cause a
lockup.
A lockup that occurs with interrupts enabled is called a soft-lockup. Some soft lockups
can render the system unusable by permanently preempting all other threads. Such soft
lockup errors can be detected by software. The Linux kernel, for example, has a built-in
soft-lockup detector. A low system priority watchdog thread that wakes up every second
and touches a timestamp is spawned when the system boots. The soft lockup detector is
driven by the timer interrupt and checks to see if the timestamp is within 10 seconds of
the current time. This check confirms that the watchdog thread is periodically scheduled.
If it detects that the thread has not been scheduled for more than 10 seconds, it displays a
message reporting the lockup error and records it in the system logs.
The soft lockup detector cannot detect lockups that occur when interrupts are disabled
because the detector code is not executed. These errors are called hard lockups and can
only be detected by an external observer. Hardware watchdog timers are normally used
for this purpose. These timers are normally wired to the reset pin on the processor. They
work by requiring the operating system to periodically restart the timer in order to signal
the health of the software. If the operating system is in a locked up state, the timer expires,
restarting the system.
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Table 5.1: Effectiveness of lockup detectors
Kernel type Lockup location Soft lockup detector Watchdog timer
Non-preemptable Interruptible code Yes YesNon-interruptible code No Yes
Preemptable Interruptible code Yes NoNon-interruptible code No Yes
Quoting Murphy et al. [60]: The process of restarting the watchdog timer’s counter
is sometimes called “kicking the dog.” The appropriate visual metaphor is that of a man
being attacked by a vicious dog. If he keeps kicking the dog, it can’t ever bite him. But he
must keep kicking the dog at regular intervals to avoid a bite. Similarly, the software must
restart the watchdog timer at a regular rate, or risk being restarted.
Microsoft Windows, Linux and most other operating systems configure watchdog timers
to reset the processor when they expire and thus trigger a reboot in order to recover the com-
puter. While this improves overall system availability, it unfortunately results in the loss
of all running user programs and data. CuriOS, on the other hand, possesses the surprising
ability to recover the system even after a processor reset issued by a watchdog timer. The
key observation that allows this approach to system recovery is the fact that the reset signal
only resets the processor and leaves volatile memory intact. Information loss is limited to
the contents of the processor at the time of the reset and the contents of volatile memory
can be used to continue running the operating system.
Despite their popularity, hardware watchdog timers are not the complete solution to
lockup detection. The preemptability of the kernel and the location of a lockup error influ-
ence whether or not the lockup will be detected by an external watchdog timer. Table 5.1
catalogs the detectability of lockups for a non-preemptable and a preemptable kernel. Soft-
ware solutions are the only viable detection tool for lockups in interruptible and preempt-
able kernel code. These lockups don’t impede progress of other threads, but nevertheless
cause the processor to perform computation that is not useful when the locked up thread is
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scheduled. Detection of such lockup errors is usually achieved by monitoring the progress
of individual threads in the system [61]. CuriOS is a fully preemptable kernel and cur-
rently only supports hardware watchdog timer based lockup detection. Watchdog kicks
are issued from the timer interrupt handler and non-interruptible hard lockups are always
detected. The design of a soft lockup detector for CuriOS is a promising direction for
extending this research.
On some platforms, it is possible to wire watchdog timers to a non-maskable interrupt.
This can be used to signal the operating system directly instead of forcibly restarting it.
Unfortunately, the ARMv5 processors in our target platforms do not include support for
non-maskable interrupts.
5.3.1 Creating Lockup Exceptions
Instead of rebooting, CuriOS is designed to recover when a lockup condition results in a
processor reset issued by the watchdog timer. CuriOS revives the computer system from
the contents of volatile memory and raises a C++ exception in the context of the locked up
thread. The following paragraphs describe the process of recovering from a processor reset
and dispatching a lockup exception.
When the ARM processor is reset, it sets its program counter to address 0x00000000
and the reset reason (watchdog or power-on) is logged in a peripheral register. The CPSR is
reset to place the processor in a privileged execution mode. The signal also resets the inter-
rupt controller and all interrupts are turned off. The memory management unit (MMU) is
turned off and thus only physical addressing is possible. Address 0x00000000 is normally
the start address of the boot loader in flash memory. The boot loader’s job is to initialize
the memory hardware and load the operating system kernel into RAM from flash memory
or secondary storage. It then relinquishes control to the operating system. The boot loader
usually does not differentiate between resets attributed to watchdog timers and power-on
resets. Thus, the operating system is always reloaded and rebooted, causing a loss of all
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Figure 5.1: Creating an exception from a watchdog bite. Shaded registers identify changes
from the previous stage.
Stage 1-Processor registers just before watchdog bites
Stage 2-Processor registers just after watchdog bites
Stage 3-Registers saved by boot loader and approximated PC and CPSR
Stage 4-Modified registers made to look like locked thread made a function call
running programs and data in memory.
In order to ensure that the contents of memory are preserved, the boot loader needs be
modified to treat the watchdog bite differently. When the watchdog bites, the boot loader
should not reload the kernel and should instead directly transfer control to the operating
system start address in the memory. This is possible because once it is up and running, the
operating system core is never paged out and resides in the same physical memory area
into which it was first loaded.
Once the operating system regains control, a special restore routine takes over. The re-
store process involves switching the MMU back on, initializing the interrupt controller, re-
enabling interrupts and creating a lockup exception in the context of the locked up thread.
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An exception can only be properly dispatched by the C++ exception handling libraries if
the context in which the exception is thrown is correct. The values of the PC, LR, SP and
FP registers should be valid. Thus, simply writing a C++ throw statement in the recovery
routine will not work. We needed a way to recover the context of the locked up thread at the
time of the watchdog bite. After some experimentation, we discovered that the processor
does not lose the contents of most of its registers when it is reset. The program counter
is lost because it is reset to 0x0. The value of the CPSR is also lost. But the contents of
all the other registers (including SP and FP) are preserved. This is illustrated in stage 2 of
figure 5.1, which depicts an example infinite loop lockup in the memory page out service.
We modified the boot loader to respond to a watchdog bite by storing the contents of
the reset preserved registers (R2-R14) into a predefined memory region before they are
clobbered by running the recovery routine. The contents of R0 and R1 are lost because
these registers are used in the store routine for the rest of the registers. But these two
values are not required to dispatch an exception. Since the values of LR, SP and FP are
recovered, the only remaining register that needs to be valid is PC.
We choose to approximate the value of the PC as the first instruction of the function in
which the lockup occurred. In machine code generated by the GNU C++ compiler, the PC
is saved on the stack frame in the preamble of every function. We can read the last saved
PC from the stack using the recovered stack frame pointer register (FP) and use this value.
A valid CPSR is also required in order to continue executing the thread. The CPSR
stores the current processor mode, condition and interrupt flags. Since the lockup happens
in kernel mode, the CPSR value can be set to kernel mode with interrupts enabled (the
other flags are not relevant for recovery and can be ignored). Once the recovery routine
is ready to dispatch the exception, it populates a context object with these register values.
This results in stage 3 in the figure.
The context of the locked up thread is now usable for dispatching an exception. A copy
of this context is saved for debugging the error. This context object is now modified to
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make it seem like the locked thread called a kernel function which uses C++ throw syntax
to raise an exception. In order to do this, the LR is set to the value of PC and PC is set to the
start address of the function. This emulates the effect of the Branch Link (BL) instruction
on ARM that is used for function calls. This is illustrated by stage 4 in the figure. In order
to complete the recovery process, this modified context is restored on the processor. The
lockup condition is eliminated and a C++ exception is raised in the locked up thread.
The exception that is thrown is an instance of ARMWatchdogTimeoutException.
This class inherits from the same base class as other exception classes in CuriOS. Standard
C++ try-catch syntax can be used to watch for and handle these exceptions.
5.3.2 Limitations
There are a couple of issues that arise when attempting to recover from watchdog bites
that reset the processor. Recovery from processor resets requires that the on-chip processor
cache is configured as write-through instead of write-back in order to avoid loss of data in
the cache after a reset. Thus, when using this technique, we gain increased reliability for
some decreased performance. Also, part of the processor context at the time the watchdog
bites is lost forever (PC, for example is instantaneously overwritten by 0x0). This makes it
difficult to accurately pinpoint the location of the lockup and debug the error. Both these
issues are non-existent if the watchdog timer is wired to a non-maskable interrupt on the
processor. This would enable the operating system to respond to the lockup without any
loss of information in the processor or the cache. All register values will be correct (and
can be logged) and debugging the error is easier. The write-through cache requirement
is eliminated and recovery is possible without paying a performance penalty for normal
operation. Using an NMI also simplifies the recovery implementation because it does not
disturb the MMU and interrupt controllers.
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5.3.3 Lockup Exception Handling or Thread Termination
With support for lockup exceptions, it is extremely easy to implement simple recovery
techniques such as method call retries using exception handlers. An alternate recovery
strategy is to terminate the thread that encountered the error. The intuition behind this
approach is that one bad thread may be sacrificed in order to allow the rest of the system
to continue operation. The Linux kernel widely uses this approach to deal with many types
of kernel errors. This motivated us to explore the effect of this technique on recoverability
from kernel lockup errors.
We ran experiments to compare the exception handling and thread termination ap-
proaches to recovery. For the exception handling experiments, C++ “catch” statements
are used to handle exceptions by simply retrying the request. For the thread termination
experiments, CuriOS was programmed to point the locked up thread to a termination func-
tion instead of the function that raises the lockup exception. Protected object restarts were
not used for this experiment.
A modified version of the QEMU emulator [23] was used to perform hundreds of au-
tomated lockup fault injection experiments in CuriOS. We randomly pick instruction ad-
dresses into which faults are to be injected. A fault is injected by changing the chosen
instruction to a self-loop. Interrupts are also disabled in order to create a hard lockup error.
The fault is transient and is not re-encountered if the instruction is executed again. We
inject only one lockup in each experiment. In one set of experiments, faults are injected
when running a gunzip decompression program. In another set, faults are injected when
running a sort program. Our goal is to examine if lockups in random parts of the operating
system affect the successful completion of these user tasks. The watchdog detects all the
hard lockups errors that are encountered.
Figure 5.2 compares the recovery capabilities of the exception based approach with the
thread termination based approach. Handling errors using exceptions results in the user
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Figure 5.2: CuriOS hard lockup recovery comparison
task completing successfully from about 6-9% more lockups than when using thread ter-
mination. This is because exception handlers in various CuriOS objects attempt to recover
the locked thread by retrying the method call that failed and some of these retries are suc-
cessful. Non-recovered lockups are mostly due to data structures left in an inconsistent
state. This may be improved significantly by the protected object restart mechanism.
5.3.4 Related Work
Lockup errors can also be detected by hardware enhancements to the processor such as the
RSE [62], processor monitoring hardware [63] and logic in the southbridge chipset [64].
The RMK framework [9] detects an operating system lockup by using an APIC to count the
number of instructions between two consecutive context switches. They reboot the system
if a lockup is detected and do not recover running programs.
There is some directly related research in application recovery after operating system
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crashes. The recovery box approach [65] uses non-volatile memory to store application
state that is restored when the system is restarted after a crash. Researchers at Rutgers
have used remote-DMA in order to access the memory of a crashed system and recover
application state [66]. In the Rio file system [67], the buffer cache is recovered from volatile
memory after a reset. We recover complete system state after a reset. OKE [56] can detect
and recover lockup errors in operating system extensions compiled with a safety enforcing
trusted C compiler. Our recovery approach does not require a special compiler and works
with existing code.
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Chapter 6
Restart-Based Error Recovery
6.1 Component Restarts
Exceptions are raised when errors are detected while executing code within a protected ob-
ject. Exceptions that are not handled within the object are intercepted at the wrapper which
attempts to destroy and re-create the protected object. This is similar to microrebooting
or server restarts in Minix3 and can be used to fix transient hardware or software faults.
The protected object is re-created in-place in memory ensuring that external references to
it remain valid. The method call is immediately retried on the newly constructed protected
object. Multiple retry failures cause an exception to be returned to the caller. All normal
system activity is suspended until the recovery is completed.
The pseudo code listing in figure 6.1 shows the implementation of the restart mecha-
nism using the wrapper. The changes from the example initially described in Chapter 3
figure 3.3 are underlined. If an exception is intercepted by the wrapper, the destructor is
explicitly invoked on the object and this is followed by an in-place reconstruction using the
placement form of the C++ new operator. The example shown is a simple case where the
protected object does not have any constructor arguments. If required, the wrapper main-
tains a copy of the constructor arguments in order to re-create the protected object. The
retryCount variable counts down from the N available attempts at invoking the method
call. If none of the attempts succeed, the exception is escalated.
Component restarts and multi-threading present an interesting challenge to recovery.
For example, the recovery subsystem should handle component restarts when multiple
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class Example {
public:
Example() {
// Constructor
}
˜Example() {
// Destructor
}
void runExample() {
// Code executed in protected object context
}
};
class ExampleWrapper: public Example {
public:
void runExample() {
switchStack();
switchHeap();
dropPrivilegeLevel();
int retryCount = N;
do {
try {
Example::runExample();
break;
} catch (Exception e) {
// In-place destruction and re-creation
this->Example::˜Example();
new ((void *)this) ExampleWrapper();
}
} while(retryCount--);
elevatePrivilegeLevel();
restoreHeap();
restoreStack();
if (allRetriesFail) throw e; // Escalate exception
}
};
Figure 6.1: Pseudo code for the protected object restart implementation
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threads are executing inside the object. A related scenario occurs when a restart is is-
sued during a recursive call into the protected object by a single thread. This problem is
not new and has been previously addressed by the Hot-Restart technology in the Chorus
operating system [39]. In order to prevent interference from new threads that would like
to execute code in the component, Chorus freezes the component. CuriOS achieves the
same effect by freezing the entire system for the duration of recovery. Chorus terminates
all threads that were executing inside the component at the time of the restart and requires
an external “Site Personality Manager” to reactivate the component and create new threads
if required. An alternative recovery strategy is to rewind all the threads and resume their
execution from their entry points into the component. CuriOS does not completely support
multiple thread recovery and this is a rich topic for additional research. In the current ver-
sion of CuriOS, an exception is raised in each thread, resulting in multiple restarts before
complete recovery is possible.
6.2 Server State Management
Operating system servers that need to maintain state information about clients use the state
management functionality provided by CuiK to distribute, isolate, and persist client-related
state.
A Server State Region (SSR) is an object representing a region of memory that is allo-
cated to store an operating system server’s client-related information. An SSR is created
when a client establishes a connection to the server. For accounting purposes, the mem-
ory associated with the SSR is charged to the client. SSRs are protected from both the
server and the client through hardware-supported virtual memory protection mechanisms.
A client is never granted access to its SSR. A server is only granted write access to a client’s
SSR when it is processing a request from that client (see figure 6.2). The SSR is passed as
an argument to the server’s protected method call. The server can then use the SSR to store
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client-related information. It has full control over management of the memory within the
SSR. Write permissions to the SSR are revoked when the protected method call returns.
SSRs are implemented using a C++ object that holds a pointer to a hardware-protectable
region of memory.
All SSRs in CuriOS are managed by a singleton object called the SSRManager. The
SSRManager provides the functions used to register a new server, bind a client to a server
(resulting in the creation of an SSR), undo a client-server binding (deletion of the associated
SSR) and enumerate all the SSRs associated with a server. Each server using SSRs is
required to provide a recovery routine that is invoked immediately after the server object is
re-created upon a failure. This routine can query the SSRManager to obtain all associated
SSRs in order to re-create the internal state of the restarted server.
Clients do not require any knowledge of the presence of SSRs and the SSR-based in-
teraction with servers is managed completely by CuiK. The functions that implement the
mapping and unmapping of an SSR into a server’s address space are written as part of the
wrapper that implements protected objects. The pseudo code for the this implementation
is shown in figure 6.3. The changes from figure 6.1 are underlined.
The mapSSR and unmapSSR functions manipulate the private protected object page
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tables in order to control access to the relevant SSR. While these functions can interact with
the SSRManager to locate the appropriate SSR, the current implementation simplifies this
process by requiring clients to present the handles obtained when binding to the server, for
every protected method call. Unfortunately, this limits SSR transparency to clients and
also limits drop-in replacements of normal objects with wrappers implementing protected
objects. It should be noted that this is just a limitation of the implementation and is not a
limitation of the design. We expect that the next major revision of the CuriOS code will
address this issue and provide complete transparency.
It should be noted that the changes in figure 6.3 are only used for servers that use SSRs.
Servers that don’t require SSRs are implemented as plain restartable protected objects.
An SSR-based service provides protection from unbounded internal error propagation
when compared to a traditional microkernel service. This protection is due to the fact that
errors that occur when a particular SSR is mapped in cannot directly corrupt the state in
SSRs that are not mapped in. This reduces the probability of intra-component error propa-
gation. It may not be possible to completely eliminate intra-component error propagation
because of the presence of other channels such as function call arguments and local pro-
tected object state. We expect that such cases will not occur often. Nevertheless, strong
function argument checking should help mitigate error propagation in these cases.
6.3 Operating System Service Construction
Servers that don’t maintain any client-related state can be easily restarted and do not require
state management functionality described in the previous section. Similar to popular usage,
we refer to such servers as stateless. Note that this does not imply that the server has no
internal state; it only implies that the server maintains no session state. Each request to
such a server is treated independently.
On the other hand, many operating system servers maintain client-related state and are
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class Example {
public:
Example() {
// Constructor
}
˜Example() {
// Destructor
}
void runExample() {
// Code executed in protected object context
}
};
class ExampleWrapper: public Example {
public:
void runExample() {
switchStack();
switchHeap();
mapSSR();
dropPrivilegeLevel();
int retryCount = N;
do {
try {
Example::runExample();
break;
} catch (Exception e) {
// In-place destruction and re-creation
this->Example::˜Example();
new ((void *)this) ExampleWrapper();
}
} while(retryCount--);
elevatePrivilegeLevel();
unmapSSR();
restoreHeap();
restoreStack();
if (allRetriesFail) throw e; // Escalate exception
}
};
Figure 6.3: Pseudo code for the SSR mapping and unmapping implementation
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stateful. How should the state of a generic stateful server be structured in order to use the
state management support provided by CuiK? Stateful servers can be classified into two
types. The first type is a server that does not require information about all of its clients
in order to service a request. A server that provides pseudo-random numbers based on a
per-client seed is one such example. It only needs to know the client’s seed in order to
service a request from that client. Such servers can store client information in SSRs and
can be transparently restarted upon a failure. All future client requests will continue to
work correctly because its SSRs and the information stored in them is not lost.
The second type is a server that requires knowledge about all of its clients in order to
service a request. Examples of this type are operating system services like the scheduler
and timer managers. Such servers can store client related information in SSRs and can
redundantly cache this information locally to process requests. Upon a restart, such a
server should be able to re-create its internal state from its distributed SSRs. Depending
on the design or implementation of the server, it is possible that some internal state is
irrecoverable and cannot be completely reconstructed. For most operating system services,
we believe that this is a reasonable trade-off when compared with the complete state loss
alternative. Several stateful CuriOS components are structured as one of these two types of
servers. The key observation here is that the use of SSRs makes stateful servers look like
stateless servers from a restartability viewpoint.
There are a few other design issues that need to be considered when writing operating
system services using SSRs. It is possible that the SSR that was in use at the time an error
occurs is corrupted. The recovery routine in the server can check the consistency of the
objects in SSRs using simple heuristics before using them. CuriOS uses magic numbers in
objects and these are checked for corruption. CuriOS also uses server-specific checks to
ensure that pointers and numbers are within expected ranges. Multi-threaded servers may
use locks to control access to data structures. It is possible for a failure to occur during
the update of a lock-protected structure. The recovery routine should be able to re-create
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the internal data structure to ensure consistency as well as ensure the correct state of the
internal locks.
Unlike EROS which does consistency checks of all state during normal running time,
these SSR consistency checks in CuriOS are only performed on exceptional conditions that
require server recovery.
CuriOS has some limitations that are common with several other microkernel systems
that execute operating system code in unprivileged mode. It is expensive to switch proces-
sor modes to perform privileged operations. A reasonable balance between performance
and reliability should be considered when designing operating system services as protected
objects. In some cases it is possible to split functionality so that some privileged operations
can be performed by an helper object that resides inside CuiK.
6.4 Intra-Component Error Propagation
The microkernel-like partitioning of operating system components in CuriOS limits inter-
component error propagation. The further partitioning of individual service state into SSRs
provides protection from intra-component error propagation as well. In this section, we will
illustrate this property by examining in detail all possible avenues for the propagation of an
error that occurs within a CuriOS service.
When an error occurs in a server during the processing of a client request, the mem-
ory protection enforced by the protected object mechanism limits damage to the writeable
regions of the server’s address space. This includes server local state (if any) and all the
SSRs that are mapped in at that time. The SSRs that are not mapped in are not immediately
affected.
Can an error eventually propagate to unmapped SSRs? There are two possible propa-
gation paths that may allow this to happen. These are illustrated in figure 6.4. The image
on the left represents an operating system service that has just encountered an error. The
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Figure 6.4: Error propagation between SSRs
darker boxes represent state that has been corrupted by the error.
One path involves undetected corruption of server local state, which in turn results in
the error propagating to an SSR that gets mapped in at a later point in time. In cases where
the server has no writeable internal state and all required state is maintained in the SSRs,
this avenue for error propagation does not exist. The other path involves corruption of some
external state as an intermediate step in propagating the error to other SSRs. The external
state can be present in either software or hardware. External software state is affected by
function call arguments or return values. Hardware state can be affected through either
directly or indirectly allowed access.
Because CuriOS servers are multi-threaded, it is possible that multiple SSRs are mapped
in when an error occurs. In this case, the error propagation is limited to the SSRs that are
currently mapped in. This can be further improved by including support for thread-level
memory protection.
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6.5 Recoverable Errors
Protected method calls to servers are designed to retry the request after a server fails and
restarts during the processing of the request. SSR-based recovery addresses a large class
of errors that result in corrupted local operating system service state. Complete recon-
struction of service local state during recovery can remedy any such corruption. When an
SSR is corrupted and multiple attempts at recovery fail, only the client associated with the
corrupted SSR is affected and will need to be notified of a failure. The other clients of
the service can continue to function normally. Thus, SSR-based recovery can minimize
the impact of a software bug that is triggered by a specific client request and a consequent
failure. When repeated attempts at processing the request fail, the client can be notified
and the service can continue processing other requests that do not trigger the bug. This il-
lustrates that SSR-based restart-recovery mechanisms are effective against both heisenbugs
and bohrbugs [68].
Restarting a service that has visible external effects may not always result in correct
behavior. For example, restarting a printer driver due to a failure may cause another copy of
the print job to be dispatched. This problem may be ameliorated to some degree by writing
code that is restart-aware. This is achieved by incorporating some means of recording
the progress made in servicing a request. This limitation has also been acknowledged for
device driver restarts in Minix3 [35]. Similar to the approach taken by Minix3, we advocate
notification of possible non-transparent recovery to applications or users.
It is important to note that our design does not attempt to provide recovery for generic
distributed processes that have arbitrary levels of complexity and interaction. We are only
attempting to show that many typical operating system services can be constructed using
such a scheme in order to build a highly reliable operating system layer.
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Chapter 7
Restartable Components
In this chapter, we discuss the details of implementing several CuriOS components as
restartable protected objects. As described earlier in Chapter 6, these components are ei-
ther stateless or stateful. Stateless components can be easily restarted whereas stateful
components are designed to use SSRs for transparent restarts.
7.1 Stateless Components
7.1.1 Hardware Device Drivers
Several hardware device drivers are encapsulated in protected objects to contain error prop-
agation. The serial port driver in CuriOS is implemented as a protected object with com-
plete access to the memory mapped registers of the serial port controller. This protected
object is stateless and only has one client: the CuriOS console object. Errors that occur
when reading or writing to the serial port are handled by restarting this protected object
and retrying the request. CuriOS has a NOR flash driver that is implemented as a stateless
protected object. This protected object is created with read/write access rights to physical
memory regions that map to NOR flash chips. An error that occurs in this protected object
can lead to potential corruption of arbitrary data stored in NOR flash, but cannot easily
corrupt read-only mapped system memory. Protected objects are also used to encapsulate
drivers for interacting with the hardware timers. These are used to start, query and stop the
hardware timers. Interrupts from the hardware timers are also dispatched to them. These
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are currently stateless and can be restarted.
7.1.2 File System Drivers
CuriOS inherits the file system design from Choices. Low-level file system drivers imple-
ment individual file systems. Additional file system functionality such as buffer manage-
ment and application interaction is managed by other layers. We modified two stateless
low-level file system drivers in CuriOS to use protected objects.
CramFSFileObject is a class that provides access to a compressed file on the read-
only CramFS file system [69]. When a file is opened, an instance of this class is created
as a protected object. This instance only has information about its backing storage and
does not maintain any state regarding clients. Hence it does not require usage of the server
state management functionality. The method call to read a file provides both the offset into
the file and the required number of bytes. The protected object is only granted privileges
to modify its own data and the destination buffer. Calls to other objects like the backing
storage are mediated by CuiK. Using a protected object for each file has several reliability
benefits. An error that occurs when processing one file is contained within the protected
object and cannot corrupt arbitrary memory in the system. If the error were transient, a
restarted protected object can continue serving clients. If there is an error in a compressed
file stored on the disk that causes the decompression routines to fail, it only causes an error
in the clients that were reading that particular file.
CuriOS also includes support for the Linux ext2 file system. An Ext2Container
protected object is created for every ext2 file system on disk. This manages the inode and
free space bitmaps. If this protected object crashes and restarts, it can re-read this informa-
tion from disk. An Ext2Inode protected object is tasked with managing all interaction
with a file. This protected object only has privileges to modify the inode it represents,
which, in turn, has all the pointers to disk blocks comprising the file. This has similar
reliability benefits as the CramFSFileObject protected object. Since protected objects
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are re-created in-place, the same objects can be used to access the file after the service is
restarted.
It is important to realize that when we refer to file system service recovery, we are not
dealing with recovering corrupted file system state on disk. There are many other programs
that are designed to handle corrupted disk blocks and this is an orthogonal problem with
recovering the state information for a live file system server. It is possible that an error that
occurs in the file system service results in corruption of state on the disk before the service
is restarted and recovered. The combination of file system service recovery provided by
CuriOS and disk state recovery using other tools results in an extremely reliable file store.
7.2 Stateful Components
7.2.1 Timer Management
A PeriodicTimerManager service provided by CuriOS allows clients to access timer
functionality. There is only one instance of this class in the system and it is created as
a protected object. The manager itself depends on device driver objects for the hard-
ware timers. Clients interact with this service through a PeriodicTimer helper ob-
ject and can request to be notified periodically. The PeriodicTimer registers with
the PeriodicTimerManager on behalf of the client when the timer is started. When
the client calls the await() method, it starts to wait on a semaphore. The job of the
PeriodicTimerManager is to signal the semaphore when the client’s time is up. In
order to support recovery from a restart of the PeriodicTimerManager service, SSRs
are used to persist and distribute information regarding each PeriodicTimer client.
This includes the semaphore, starting time and the timer period. Within the service, timer
functionality is implemented using a linked list that holds pending notification events.
Upon a restart, the PeriodicTimerManager can re-create its internal linked list from
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the timer period and starting time information in the distributed SSRs. This allows it to
continue sending notifications to registered clients.
7.2.2 Scheduling
CuriOS schedulers are modeled as a container into which processes can be added or re-
moved. They implement a particular scheduling strategy by determining the order in which
processes can be removed. All schedulers inherit from the ProcessContainer base
class. The interface exported by all schedulers includes the following methods: add(),
remove() and isEmpty(). The scheduling logic is implemented by specific sub-
classes. A FIFO scheduler, for example, is implemented using a list of processes to run
and only allows processes to be removed in the order that they were originally inserted.
The system scheduler is created as a protected object with clients as individual pro-
cesses. SSRs are used by the scheduler to store scheduling information about each process.
If the scheduler is restarted after a failure, it queries the SSRManager for all its clients and
re-creates its internal list. The ordering of processes in the scheduler queue can be loosely
maintained during the reconstruction phase by querying process attributes. For example,
a priority-based scheduler can sort the reconstructed queue based on process priority. The
original ordering in the scheduler queue may be lost upon restart if multiple processes have
the same priority.
7.2.3 Networking
The recovery mechanisms in CuriOS allow for the construction of an extremely reliable
network protocol stack. CuriOS uses the lwIP networking stack [70] encapsulated in two
restartable protected objects: one for managing TCP connections and the other for UDP.
In order to enable lwIP to work with CuriOS, we had to first refactor the lwIP C code
to C++ code by changing C functions to C++ object methods. This was necessary in
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order to adhere to the protected object model in CuriOS. The functional changes to lwIP
primarily focused on its internal memory management framework. Our changes ensure that
allocations of the data structures that manage TCP and UDP state are performed from SSRs
instead of the default protected object memory allocator. More specifically, lwIP creates
a tcp pcb or a udp pcb data structure to manage state information for every connection.
We refactored lwIP code to place these data structures within SSRs. In the case of TCP,
for example, this includes all information necessary to service the incoming and outgoing
packets of a connection. This includes the network addresses, ports, windows, sequence
numbers and so on. If the TCP service crashes and is restarted, this information is used to
resume the processing of packets. If this state information is not preserved during a restart,
the unfortunate consequence is that all network connections in progress will be terminated.
Each SSR is associated with a client Socket object and is mapped into the TCP ob-
ject’s address space when interacting with it. When there is an incoming packet, the cor-
responding SSR is located and mapped in before sending it through the stack. A similar
approach is used to provide access to SSRs for the TCP object’s timer driven events.
Integration of the lwIP stack also involved converting all the assert code in lwIP to
throw exceptions instead of halting the stack. This comprehensive error detection in lwIP
helps reduce error propagation and improves recovery rates.
lwIP only provides higher networking layer functionality and does not include device
drivers for the hardware at the lowest level. We were able to modify Linux drivers for the
Ethernet chip on our target platforms to work with CuriOS in order to provide this function-
ality. lwIP only works for Ethernet networks. CuriOS inherits MAC layer demultiplexing
code for different networks from Choices and only dispatches Ethernet messages into the
lwIP stack. The low-level Ethernet driver is stateless and is not restarted when the rest of
the lwIP stack is restarted.
How is the restartable network stack in CuriOS different from other network connec-
tion recovery techniques? In order to cope with network disconnection events in traditional
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operating systems, a few high-level network protocols such as HTTP and FTP support
resuming an interrupted data transfer after establishing a new TCP connection. This re-
quires application support and is not widely adopted. The transparent recovery of the
network stack provided by CuriOS ensures uninterrupted operation for applications using
non-resumable connection-oriented protocols.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation
In this chapter we evaluate the CuriOS implementation in terms of error recovery capabil-
ities as well as performance and memory overheads. A brief analysis of the refactoring
effort involved in converting operating system services to use the state management frame-
work in CuriOS is also presented.
8.1 Error Recovery
In order to analyze the error recovery capabilities of CuriOS services, we resort to fault
injection experiments using a modified version of QEMU. It should be noted that error
recovery works equally well on real hardware and we only use the emulator in order to
provide non-intrusive and large-scale automated fault injection.
Our fault injection tool picks a random instruction in the server code and injects a fault
just before that instruction is executed. In each experiment run, we inject exactly one fault.
We inject two types of faults. The first type of fault is a memory access fault (or data
abort). These virtual memory faults are instantaneously detected at the injected instruction
and immediately cause an error. The fault latency is zero in this case and error propagation
is limited. The other type of fault that we study is a register bit-flip. The tool randomly
flips a bit in one of the register operands for the selected instruction. Register bit-flips do
not always lead to errors. This is because a corrupted register can be overwritten by the
result of the instruction. They can, however, lead to latent errors which may not be detected
immediately. This type of fault has been previously used by other researchers to emulate
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Figure 8.1: Error recovery after fault injection: The “M” columns present results for the
memory access fault experiments and the “R” columns present results for the register bit-
flip experiments.
several common programming errors such as incorrect assignment statements and pointer
corruptions [71].
We study error recovery for the file system, timer manager, system scheduler and the
networking stack. We perform hundreds of fault injection experiments per service and
the results are shown in figure 8.1. The Y axis represents the percentage of faults that
had some visible manifestation (errors). Note that all of these manifested faults would
result in a service or system failure in most existing operating systems. On the other hand,
restart recovery with state management used by CuriOS allows it to recover from significant
numbers of such errors.
An error is reported as successfully recovered if the operating system is usable after
service recovery. This is confirmed by testing its ability to schedule new processes and
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access the disk. In some cases, a client’s connection to a server is terminated because
of a corrupted SSR or repeated errors while the system as well as other clients using the
restarted service still remain usable. We count such cases as successful system recovery in
the figure shown. In the face of arbitrary errors that corrupt a client’s SSR or request, there
is no possibility of maintaining the unfortunate client’s connection.
8.1.1 File System
We run several programs that access files on disk and inject faults into the ext2 file system
code that handles requests from these programs. This code is present in the Ext2Inode
protected object.
The memory abort faults are always completely recovered after a retry. 13% of the
manifested register bit-flip faults are not detected by the protected object mechanism and
are therefore not recovered. These cause the system to fail. This is because register bit-flip
errors can propagate to other CuriOS subsystems through invalid method call arguments.
We do not yet perform an exhaustive check of the validity of all method call arguments in
CuriOS. The addition of such checks would help improve error confinement and recovery
rates.
8.1.2 Timer
This experiment is set up so that a couple of processes that use the timer are started before
faults are injected into the service. These are simple applications like a clock that displays
the time of day.
The memory abort errors are fully recovered by reconstructing the internal timer list. In
the register bit-flip injections we see some cases (3%) where errors are detected but are not
recovered. 6% of the register-bit flips evade detection by the protected object mechanism
and cause unrecoverable errors in other parts of CuriOS.
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8.1.3 Scheduler
This experiment is set up similar to the timer manager experiment with several running
processes in the system. Faults are injected into the system scheduler. The goal of this
experiment is to examine if a failure in the scheduler can be recovered. This would allow
CuiK to continue scheduling processes.
For the memory abort experiments, re-creation of the internal linked list is always suc-
cessful. In the case of the register bit-flip experiments, 6% of the errors are not detected by
the protected object mechanism and cause CuriOS to crash. We noted that in a few experi-
ments, one process was sacrificed to allow the rest of the system to continue functioning.
8.1.4 Network
We run a simple web server and an echo server in CuriOS while also running an HTTP
client that fetches a half-megabyte file from an external host. Faults are injected into the
lwIP code for TCP processing of IP packets on both the send and receive paths. If an error
is detected, the TCP stack protected object is restarted and the request is retried. If multiple
attempts at executing the request fail, an exception is thrown. If this exception is thrown
when processing an incoming IP packet, the packet is silently dropped by the IP layer.
This has no effect on the correctness of TCP because this is similar to packet loss on the
network and is recovered by the TCP stack. If an exception is thrown back to a client with
a TCP connection handle, the TCP connection for that client is terminated. We verify that
the network stack is still usable and other connections are unaffected in spite of a single
connection failure.
For the network stack, 5% of the manifested register-bit flip faults are not detected and
consequently, not recovered. While the system is recovered in 95% of the cases, 45% of
these recoveries were at the cost of a single client’s TCP connection termination due to
state corruption.
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Table 8.1: Protected method call performance
Protected call Instruction overhead Time overhead (microseconds)
Without SSR 1593.77± 3.57 195.65± 0.48
With SSR 4893.33± 2.83 378.93± 0.93
8.2 Performance
A protected method call incurs additional processing overhead in comparison to a normal
C++ method call. We made use of both of CuriOS’ supported platforms to measure the
overhead associated with protected method calls. On the OMAP1610 H2 hardware plat-
form we measured the overhead in terms of microseconds of execution, and on the QEMU
emulator we measured the overhead in terms of instructions executed. The OMAP1610
processor was clocked at 96 MHz, and the same test source code was used for both plat-
forms. Table 8.1 shows the overheads for the two types of protected method calls: a
protected call into a stateless server that does not require the mapping of an SSR and a
protected call info a server that uses an SSR to manage state information. In the second
case, additional processing is required to map the SSR into memory. The time overhead for
switching into and out of a protected object domain is comparable to the cost of perform-
ing two context switches (148 microseconds for two switches) in CuriOS. Since a protected
method call is analogous to switching between two microkernel domains, we believe that
this represents acceptable performance. The numbers reported here are the average of 100
trials with error estimates provided by the sample standard deviation. We believe that these
overheads may be further reduced with careful code optimization.
Apart from the extra code implementing the protected object mechanism, a major
source of overhead is the need to flush the TLB when switching between page tables.
While the ARM architecture allows for selective flushing of TLB entries, our current im-
plementation does not support this feature. The single address space design of CuriOS
helps to keep the costs of protected method calls down by obviating the need to flush the
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virtually tagged caches on the OMAP1610 ARM processor.
How fast does recovery happen? When an error is detected, the exception handling
framework signals the error and the C++ library unwinds the stack and destroys stack
objects. Restarting the server requires re-running the constructor for the protected object
and code to recover information from SSRs (if required). Altogether, the time from error
detection to a recovered system is usually on the order of a few hundred microseconds.
8.3 Memory Overheads
Protected objects, like user applications, require additional page tables to enforce mem-
ory protection and this results in some memory overhead. Each protected object also has
an associated heap and a stack for each thread that can execute within the protected do-
main. The memory overhead due to stacks depends on the number of threads that use the
protected object. The use of SSRs also results in some memory overheads. We use hard-
ware protection to isolate SSRs. However, hardware protection is not always available for
small memory regions. Thus the minimum size of an SSR is determined by the smallest
hardware-protectable region of memory. For example, on the ARM platform, this is a 1
KB page. Our current implementation uses a page for the minimum size of an SSR. This
results in some memory waste. If this is a concern for small embedded devices, our design
can be extended so that multiple SSRs share the same protected area. This saves space at
the cost of better isolation between the SSRs. This problem may be mitigated by future
architectural support for finer granularity of access control such as Mondriaan Memory
Protection [72]. Nevertheless, the total memory overhead per protected object in the ARM
implementation of CuriOS is only on the order of tens of kilobytes when there are a small
number of clients. This includes 20 KB for a minimal set of page tables plus memory pages
for the heap, per-thread stack and per-client SSR (at least one page for each).
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8.4 Refactoring Effort
Our proposed operating system design requires writing operating system service code to
encapsulate objects in protected domains and to utilize our state management framework.
The protected object support in CuriOS is implemented through wrapper objects. Wrap-
pers are currently written by hand and consist of a one line statement per object method.
The statement is a C++ preprocessor macro that expands to the code required to switch
into and out of the associated protection domain. This additional complexity may also be
avoided by using an automated wrapper generation tool. Code-changes are also required
to refactor operating system services so that they can make use of the state management
framework. Care should be taken to not introduce new software faults (bugs) in the process
of separating state from services.
Our experience with re-engineering operating system service code to separate state in-
dicates that it requires about 12-24 person-hours to design and refactor an operating system
service to work with our framework. This includes the time spent in fixing most bugs un-
covered using fault injection. The use of SSR-based state management in the file system,
scheduler and the timer manager required less than 50 additional lines of code in each
component. In order to convert the lwIP networking stack to use SSRs, we had to change
around 100 lines of code. This mostly involved replacing calls to its internal allocator with
the SSR-based state management code.
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Chapter 9
Fault-Tolerance Patterns
The architecture and design of CuriOS illustrate many software patterns that are used to
detect, signal and recover from errors. An excellent catalog of patterns for fault-tolerant
software is available in a recent book by Robert Hanmer [73]. In this chapter, we visit a
number of patterns described in the book and describe their usage within CuriOS.
9.1 Architectural Patterns
Escalation: When recovery or mitigation is failing and there is no hope that it will suddenly
succeed, escalate the action to the next more drastic action.
CuriOS resorts to escalation when repeated attempts at restarting a server and retrying
a client request fail. The exception intercepted at the protected object wrapper is re-raised
and error handling is delegated to the client. The client is then responsible for handling the
exception and attempting alternate recovery strategies.
Minimize Human Intervention: Humans make mistakes and are slow; to minimize down-
time the system should take care of itself, without human intervention.
Similar to other high-reliability and high-availability systems like the IBM z/OS, Cu-
riOS attempts to self-heal and does not require human involvement unless all programmed
recovery actions fail. This is important for both detection and recovery. While automated
support for these actions reduces possible human operator mistakes, such support is also
very useful from a speed perspective. Faster detection limits error propagation and fast re-
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covery ensures that applications do not encounter timeout conditions and other cascading
failures.
Units of Mitigation: Choosing to consider the entire system as a monolith limits the kinds
of recoveries that are possible without the system being unavailable. The entire system will
stop and when that happens, a complete restart is required. Choosing clear smaller units
of mitigation can help recovery.
CuriOS adopts a microkernel-type approach to operating system construction and is
built as a composition of small structural units encapsulated in protected objects. The
strong hardware-supported memory access controls limit error propagation, while also
serving as a mechanism for error detection. Each individual component is independently
restartable and represents a unit for error recovery. The intuition behind this design is also
the foundation for the Microreboot [13] paradigm. Mitigating errors at smaller components
allows the larger system to continue functioning without encountering failures.
9.2 Error Detection Patterns
Error Containment Barrier: Put a barrier into your system so that errors do not spread.
Unbounded error propagation cannot be allowed in any design for a reliable system.
Without error containment, it may be extremely difficult to incorporate recovery actions.
The protected object mechanism in CuriOS serves as an error containment barrier. Code
executing inside a protected object has restricted privileges and cannot corrupt arbitrary
regions of memory. The barrier is enforced through appropriate configuration of the pro-
cessor’s MMU.
Riding Over Transients: Sometimes the prudent thing to do is to ignore an error if it
is something that might be due to a transient situation.
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A number of errors that occur in systems can be attributed to transient faults such as
race conditions and flipped-bits in hardware. Such errors usually do not resurface when
the code is re-executed. Thus, when an error condition is detected inside a CuriOS server
during processing of a request, the request is not immediately denied. It is retried several
times before the recovery mechanism gives up and escalates the exception.
Watchdog: Institute one task watching over another to make sure that it is still behav-
ing well.
It may not always be possible for a task to ensure correctness of its own operation. An
external observer is best suited for this job. The watchdog timer support in CuriOS is a
direct application of this pattern. In this case, the monitoring entity is an external hardware
timer.
9.3 Error Recovery Patterns
Concentrated Restoration: Concentrate on the restoration task.
All recovery actions in CuriOS are performed after placing the system in a quiescent
state. This ensures uninterrupted rapid completion of the restoration actions and avoids
potentially harmful interference.
Data Reset: Restore some data to its initial (or a predetermined) value when it is found
incorrect.
The protected object restart mechanism is designed around this pattern and attempts to
mitigate the effects of any data corruption by re-initializing the state of the object. The
constructor of the object is invoked for this purpose. While more complex automatic data
structure recovery approaches have been proposed [74], this simple approach works ex-
tremely well in many cases.
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Exceptions: Handle an error in a controlled manner.
CuriOS directly applies this pattern by using the C++ exception handling support. De-
fined error handling blocks are provided as exception handlers and errors are handled in a
synchronous manner.
Limit Retries: Do not return to the scene of an error without changing something, un-
less you want the error to reoccur.
This well known principle is fully utilized in CuriOS. Simply retrying a failed request
may not always work and is the reason why CuriOS performs an additional restart of the
protected object before attempting a request retry.
Restart: Resume execution by restarting the program at hand from the beginning.
This pattern is again visible in CuriOS as the protected object restart mechanism. It
ensures that retries are limited and that data is reset. The entire restart-based recovery is
carried out as a concentrated restoration.
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Chapter 10
Additional Dependability Benefits
While the primary focus of this thesis is operating system reliability, this chapter highlights
other dependability benefits of the CuriOS architecture and implementation.
10.1 Security
Security is an important factor contributing to the overall dependability of operating sys-
tems. Some of the reliability enhancing techniques in CuriOS automatically translate into
security improvements. In this section, we describe the improvements to system integrity,
confidentiality and availability.
10.1.1 Integrity and Confidentiality
In addition to helping confine errors, the restricted memory address spaces provided by
protected objects are a good defense against misbehaving code from a security perspective
as well.
Our design follows the Need-to-Know security principle. CuriOS only maps in mem-
ory that is necessary for a protected object to execute. The heap and stack for the object
as well as the SSR region for the request are mapped in with read-write privileges. Writes
are disallowed to all other operating system data regions and code, thus protecting their in-
tegrity. This design is most closely related to Nooks, which uses similar protection policies
for kernel memory. We differ from Nooks in that protected objects are further constrained
because they execute in an unprivileged processor mode.
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Our design ensures that a server only has access to SSRs for clients currently being
serviced. This prevents a malfunctioning or compromised server from affecting the in-
tegrity of information used by inactive clients. By default, CuriOS presents code executing
in a protected object with read access to the complete operating system. Confidentiality
requirements may be addressed by enforcing additional memory access constraints to dis-
allow reads of sensitive information.
Although we restrict the scope of possible damage, we have not yet evaluated the impact
of intentionally malicious components in CuriOS. A promising direction for future work
includes building a threat model and identifying a comprehensive set of restrictions that
need to be imposed on protected objects. This may involve fortifying the protected method
call and server state management mechanisms by borrowing ideas from systems like EROS.
10.1.2 Availability
Because the SSR is allocated out of the client process assigned memory pool, the client
process cannot perform a denial of service attack by issuing requests that result in the
allocation of large amounts of operating system state. This helps ensure the availability
of operating system services. Existing designs such as the reincarnation server in Minix3
ensure high availability by simply restarting managed servers when they fail. We take
advantage of this technique to improve server availability in our system as well.
While our initial goal was to ensure that an error in the server did not unnecessarily
affect clients, our design also helps with creating robust client applications. A client can
request that its SSRs be persisted across client failures and restarts. Since the error that
caused the failure cannot corrupt the SSR, it can be used to resume an interrupted session
if the client can re-create its internal state using other techniques such as persistent memory.
For example, if the SSR holds TCP connection information from the network server, the
TCP connection can be resumed without interruption after a crash and restart of the client.
This can improve both the availability and reliability of the client.
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10.2 Maintainability
The design of CuriOS makes it possible to easily upgrade a running service. A transparent
upgrade is achieved by simply terminating the old server and starting a newer version while
preserving the SSRs. If the interface of the new server is backwards compatible and it can
interpret the existing SSRs, it can continue serving existing clients. Some related work in
this area include Pannus [75] and Ksplice [76] for Linux and dynamic updates in the K42
operating system [77].
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Chapter 11
Related Work
11.1 Fault-Tolerance
A number of standard fault tolerance techniques are available in literature. These include
redundancy in hardware and software, transactions, error correction codes for memory,
majority or Byzantine voting, and other software fault tolerance approaches [78]. Some of
these techniques can be directly applied to CuriOS to further improve its fault tolerance.
These techniques may be used to ensure that the core of the system (CuiK and recovery
code) itself is protected from failure.
In the past, designs for reliable computer systems have used redundancy in hardware
and operating system software to detect and attempt recovery from transient and perma-
nent hardware faults [79, 80]. Redundancy can be used to detect and mask some types of
software faults [81]. But it is ineffective against errors due to software bugs which affect
all replicas. Neither does it immediately address the insidious problem of the propagation
of undetected errors [4]. Additionally, these systems are extremely expensive to build and
use [82].
The QuickSilver operating system [83] uses transactions to recover to a consistent sys-
tem state after a failure. But server failures are not recovered and clients receive error
codes when they try to communicate with a failed server. Quicksilver also provides a log
manager interface that can be used by servers to store data required for recovery. But, there
is no mechanism that allows for isolation of per-client state. Also, logging encounters sub-
stantially more overheads than our lightweight memory isolation approach. VINO [84]
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also used transactions to roll-back changes made by misbehaving kernel extensions. Ar-
juna [85] is a middleware system that supports transaction-like semantics on objects to
provide failure atomicity.
We have also investigated the use of software transactional memory techniques to pro-
tect component state in CuriOS [27]. The use of transactional semantics alone to recover
complete component state is only effective when errors are detected before commits. When
this property cannot be enforced, there are no constraints on error propagation within the
component. However, when used together with our SSR-based approach that reduces error
propagation, transactions can provide an additional layer of protection to SSRs while they
are being manipulated by a service.
In addition to some of the operating systems discussed in Chapter 2, many other system
designs incorporate virtual memory protection to improve reliability. In the Rio project [67],
virtual memory access control was used to protect the file cache from corruption by errors
occurring elsewhere in the system. The protected object concept is similar to a virtual
memory protected region in Nooks [5]. However, unlike Nooks, a protected object ex-
ecutes in an unprivileged processor mode. More importantly, while Nooks is designed to
wrap operating system extensions such as device drivers, a protected object can encapsulate
core operating system components.
Unlike the shadow driver mechanism [86] used by Nooks, the SSR-based recovery
mechanisms can isolate requests that cause crashes because of a software bug and continue
servicing requests that do not trigger the bug. This is possible because of the rigorous
partitioning of per-client state in CuriOS. While the shadow driver approach may work for
heisenbugs, a bohrbug will be triggered in the shadow driver just as it was in the original
driver since the same code is used.
Operating system service design using SSRs is closely related to the principle of crash-
only software [87]. Similar to crash-only components, recovery involves a component
restart and component crashes are masked from end users using transparent component-
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level retries.
There is a large body of work related to isolating operating system extensions so that
they don’t affect the rest of the system. Chapter 2 described several microkernel systems
that achieve this goal. SPIN [88] exploits the safety properties of Modula-3 to allow users
to download code into the kernel. The OKE [56] system allows users to load arbitrary code
into the kernel. Kernel safety is ensured using a combination of trust management, a trusted
C compiler and language customizations. A couple of other software-based solutions are
XFI [21] and SafeDrive [20].
11.2 Hardware Protected Objects
The protected object paradigm in CuriOS has been previously adopted in several other
systems as well. In fact, as far back as the early 80s, Intel’s iAPX 432 microcomputer
included extensive hardware support for object-based computing. iMAX [89, 90] was a
multiprocessor operating system written in Ada and built by Intel for the iAPX 432. It was
completely designed around the idea of data abstraction and provided a uniform Ada view
of the underlying hardware and the operating system extensions. Protection was enforced
within operating system modules in order to limit the damage caused by errors.
In the ProtectOS system [91], under-utilized hardware security features of the Intel
80286 processor were exploited in order to provide isolation between objects within the
same process. More specifically, separate segments were used to store the code and data
associated with each object and achieve isolation. While the hardware mechanisms used to
implement protected objects are different from CuriOS, ProtectOS has similar motivation
and goals. Also, ProtectOS was designed for objects written in C and had special compi-
lation requirements. CuriOS implements protection using wrappers built around standard
C++ objects.
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11.3 Protection Domains
The Mungi operating system [46] used a technique called protected domain extensions [92]
to dynamically extend a caller’s protection domain for the duration of a procedure call.
While there are semantic differences with the SSR framework in CuriOS, this is similar to
mapping an SSR into a server’s protection domain in order to expand its privileges.
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Chapter 12
Future Work
12.1 Improved Error Detection
Early and comprehensive detection of errors is the first step in achieving high reliability.
While CuriOS supports several error detection methods, there are many other improve-
ments that can be made in this direction. Thorough checking of function call arguments
can reduce error propagation outside of protected object boundaries. Stronger type check-
ing through the use of other programming languages or code-rewriting tools such as those
used in SafeDrive [20] can provide an additional defensive layer.
A direct extension of this work is to take advantage of additional hardware support
available in newer ARM processors. Features such as the eXecute-Never (XN) bit and
TrustZone can be used to design better isolation containers and improve error detection.
The advent of virtualization technology provides additional opportunities for designing
error detection techniques. Processor vendors are including hardware support for virtual-
ization in order to improve performance as well as isolation. Extensions to our work can
leverage the strong isolation support provided by such technologies as a replacement for
the memory protection techniques currently used to implement protected objects. In this
scenario, the hardware’s virtualization support is used for improving the security and re-
liability of a single operating system, rather than supporting multiple operating systems.
When coupled with technologies such as the I/O-MMU [93], protected objects that use
DMA capabilities in the hardware can detect a larger subset of errors that result in invalid
memory accesses.
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12.2 Improved Error Recovery
The current version of CuriOS does not attempt to recover from unexpected errors that
occur inside the recovery routine of a previous error. In such cases, exceptions that are not
handled within the recovery routine result in system failure. It is possible to address this
limitation by escalating the original exception upon failure of the recovery routine. This
requires additional changes to the protected object wrapper. While our experimental results
indicate that this issue is not common, the addition of recursive recovery support may result
in a more robust system.
The state-preserving restarts used by CuriOS can be combined with upcoming tech-
nologies such as hardware or software transactional memory in order to enhance its error
recovery capabilities. Transactional support can be used to roll back SSR state when an
error is encountered. This is an improvement over the original design because it allows
better recovery of the SSR that is mapped into the server’s domain when it encountered
an error. Without such transactional support, arbitrary corruption of the mapped-in SSR
cannot be addressed.
We performed some limited exploration of software transactional memory for state roll
back and the results were promising [27]. Our implementation was based on the RSTM
library [94] developed at the University of Rochester. RSTM enables high-performance
non-blocking transaction-based code. Our use of the library, on the other hand, was pri-
marily motivated by the object state checkpointing feature. We believe that this direction
requires further attention and is a promising avenue for future research. Some related work
in this area include the Arjuna system [85] and VINO [84].
12.3 Parallel Computing
The recent push towards multi-core technology has revived interest in the areas of highly
parallel computation. While CuriOS was developed and tested on uniprocessor ARM
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platforms, it does include complete multiprocessor support, partly due to its roots in the
multiprocessor-capable Choices system. We envisage that future extensions to this research
will address parallelism and study performance as well as reliability improvements.
Microkernel designs such as CuriOS should perform well on multiprocessor systems
when the scheduler ensures some level of processor affinity for the operating system servers.
This helps by reducing cache misses and cache synchronization issues. The state separa-
tion approach advocated in this thesis can also exploit parallel threads to potentially speed
up operating system services. If an operating system server on one core is busy, new re-
quests may be dispatched to a duplicate server on another core. This is possible for stateless
servers since any required state is dispatched along with the request.
On the reliability front, it may be possible to replicate services in order to significantly
reduce the possibility of failure. Techniques such as N-modular redundancy and process-
pairs [68] can be applied in future systems with large numbers of cores. Hardware redun-
dancy helps with many types of hardware faults and a few types of software faults as well.
When combined with the error detection and recovery techniques presented in this thesis,
such systems can address many additional classes of software faults.
12.4 Other Hardware Architectures
The error detection, signaling and recovery techniques presented in this thesis were devel-
oped and are currently implemented only on the ARM architecture. However, the princi-
ples and ideas illustrated by CuriOS are not architecture-specific. Porting CuriOS to other
popular architectures such as the Intel x86 is a straightforward extension of this work. The
exploration of the different features provided by other architectures may reveal additional
possibilities for dependability improvements.
Because the Choices operating system, on which CuriOS is based, already runs on
several other architectures, the porting effort for CuriOS is not expected to be difficult.
82
The low-level exception handling, protection and domain-switching optimizations are the
primary architecture-dependent portions of CuriOS that will need to be ported for other
architectures.
12.5 Other Operating Systems
The state separation approach described in this work may also be applied to other microker-
nel systems which provide isolation for operating system services such as L4 and Minix3.
This would require some modifications to these kernels to incorporate SSR management
and changes to server APIs. These systems would need to also be augmented to support
the other requirements for transparent recovery detailed in Chapter 2. The benefits of com-
ponent restarts and state partitioning for operating systems that do not use inter-component
isolation is debatable. This is because there are no constraints on error propagation.
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Chapter 13
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have described the results of our efforts in building an operating system
that is resilient to errors. We analyzed the reasons why current designs for reliable micro-
kernel operating systems struggle with client-transparent recovery. Through simple fault
injection experiments with various systems, we gained insights into properties that are es-
sential for successful client-transparent recovery of operating system services. The design
and architecture of CuriOS preserves these properties. CuriOS minimizes error propaga-
tion and persists client information using distributed and isolated operating system service
state. This enhances the transparent restartability of several system components.
We explored several error detection techniques and were able to use language exception
handling to efficiently signal many detected errors. Our experimental results show that it is
possible to isolate and recover core operating system services from a significant percentage
of errors with acceptable performance.
By building CuriOS from Choices, we demonstrated that it is possible to take a modular
monolithic operating system and easily convert it to use microkernel design principles. This
attests to the power of object-oriented programming.
CuriOS has allowed us to explore many innovative reliability-enhancing techniques.
System dependability, however, is still not a solved problem. We hope that our work with
CuriOS inspires future research in this area.
The source code for our CuriOS implementation and the code for the QEMU based
fault injector can be found on our website at http://choices.cs.uiuc.edu/.
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Appendix A
The Choices Operating System
Choices is a full featured object-oriented operating system developed at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The Choices kernel is written in C++ and is implemented as
a dynamic collection of interacting objects. System resources, policies and mechanisms are
represented by objects organized in class hierarchies. The system architecture consists of
a number of subsystem design frameworks [95] that implement generalized designs, con-
straints, and a skeletal structure for customizations. Key classes within the frameworks can
be subclassed to achieve portability, customizations and optimizations without sacrificing
performance [96].
Choices includes an object-oriented framework for file systems [97] and supports sev-
eral file system formats. Files are treated as persistent memory objects. A collection of
file objects is managed by a container object. Further customization using inheritance al-
lows the interpretation of individual file formats using specialized objects. A networking
framework was also built for Choices using object-oriented techniques [98].
User applications interact with the kernel through a novel object-oriented interface [99].
A compatibility layer [100] allows users to build UNIX applications to run on Choices.
Choices is designed to be multi-processor capable [101]. It has been ported to and runs
on the SPARC [102], Intel x86 [103], ARM [29] and a couple of other platforms [104,
105]. Similar to User Mode Linux [106], a user-mode port called Virtual Choices [107]
which runs on Solaris and Linux has also been developed. The design frameworks in
Choices are inherited and customized by each hardware specific implementation of the
system providing a high degree of reuse and consistency between implementations.
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Unlike CuriOS, Choices was not originally designed with support for comprehensive
error management. Exception handling was not used in the original operating system and
this support was added recently [25]. The object-oriented nature of Choices, however, pro-
vided a strong foundation for our reliability research with CuriOS. Choices is currently
being used as a learning tool in operating systems classes at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. It is also being used as an experimental platform for research in op-
erating systems for mobile devices and multi-core processors. Additional information, re-
search publications, and source code are available on the Internet at http://choices.
cs.uiuc.edu/.
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Appendix B
The ARM Processor Architecture
ARM processors power a large percentage of the world’s mobile devices [108]. Because
most of the research presented in this thesis was performed in the context of this archi-
tecture, this Appendix provides a helpful brief introduction. We only describe the the
architecture generation found in two specific platforms that we use: the Texas Instruments
OMAP1610 based H2 development boards [22] and the ARM Integrator CP platform [24]
emulated by QEMU [23]. The processors on these platforms are part of the ARMv5 ar-
chitecture generation. After we commenced our research, new processors based on the
ARMv6 and ARMv7 generation have been released. These new processors incorporate
many additional features such as physically tagged caches and more stringent isolation
technology called TrustZone. The interested reader is referred to the Internet for informa-
tion on these additions.
ARM is a 32 bit RISC architecture. It supports a native full-fledged 32-bit instruction
set. ARM also specifies two other instruction sets: a 16-bit compressed RISC set called
Thumb, and an 8-bit instruction set for Java byte-codes called Jazelle. These are only avail-
able on selected versions of the ARM processor core. Both the ARM926EJ-S processor
in the TI OMAP1610 H2 board and the ARM1026EJ-S processor in the Integrator support
these extended instruction sets.
The ARM processors in both the OMAP and the Integrator support seven modes of
operation. There are shown in table B.1. ARM USR is the unprivileged processor mode
that is typically used for user programs. The other six are privileged processor modes and
are used by operating systems. Manipulation of security and configuration settings such
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Table B.1: ARM processor modes
Mode Description
ARM ABT Abort - used for data and instruction fetch aborts
ARM FIQ FIQ - used for fast interrupts
ARM IRQ IRQ - used for normal interrupts
ARM SVC Supervisor - privileged mode for resets and software inter-
rupts
ARM SYS System - privileged mode for operating system code
ARM UND Undefined instruction - entered when instruction decode fails
ARM USR User - unprivileged mode for user applications
as interrupts and memory management functions can only be performed by code executing
in a privileged processor mode. The processor mode is switched when the processor is
interrupted or when privileged mode code directly changes it.
The ARM architecture has 37 registers as shown in table B.2. 31 of these registers
are general purpose registers including a program counter and 6 are status registers. Some
of these registers are banked and are hidden except when executing in specific processor
modes. These registers such as the stack pointer are automatically switched when entering
a different processor mode. This design allows fast processing of interrupts as the handler
code does not need to manually switch to a new stack.
An application normally has access to 16 general purpose registers (R0-R15) and one
current program status register (CPSR). The following registers have special meaning: R15
is the program counter (PC), R14 is the link register (LR). By convention, the other general
purpose registers are assigned meanings as well: R13 is the stack pointer (SP), R12 is
the scratch register (IP), R11 is the frame pointer (FP) and R10 is the stack limit (which
is currently unused). Registers R4-R9 are callee-preserved. Registers R0-R3 are used
to pass arguments and return values when performing function calls. These register usage
conventions are defined by an Application Binary Interface (ABI) [109]. The CPSR register
holds the current processor mode, flags that control interrupt delivery and the codes used
by conditional instructions. A special set of banked registers, namely, saved program status
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Table B.2: ARM registers: Banked registers have an underscore in their names
User System Supervisor Abort Undefined Interrupt Fast Interrupt
R0 R0 R0 R0 R0 R0 R0
R1 R1 R1 R1 R1 R1 R1
R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 R2
R3 R3 R3 R3 R3 R3 R3
R4 R4 R4 R4 R4 R4 R4
R5 R5 R5 R5 R5 R5 R5
R6 R6 R6 R6 R6 R6 R6
R7 R7 R7 R7 R7 R7 R7
R8 R8 R8 R8 R8 R8 R8 fiq
R9 R9 R9 R9 R9 R9 R9 fiq
R10 R10 R10 R10 R10 R10 R10 fiq
R11 R11 R11 R11 R11 R11 R11 fiq
R12 R12 R12 R12 R12 R12 R12 fiq
R13 R13 R13 svc R13 abt R13 und R13 irq R13 fiq
R14 R14 R14 svc R14 abt R14 und R14 irq R14 fiq
R15 R15 R15 R15 R15 R15 R15
CPSR CPSR CPSR CPSR CPSR CPSR CPSR
- - SPSR svc SPSR abt SPSR und SPSR irq SPSR fiq
registers (SPSR) are used to save a copy of CPSR when switching modes. These cannot be
accessed by code executing in the ARM SYS or ARM USR modes.
The ARM processor enters special interrupt handling modes when certain events occur.
These events and modes are shown in table B.3. When an interrupt is received, the PC
register is set to either 0x00000000+offset or 0xFFFF0000+offset depending on whether
the processor is configured to use low or high interrupt vectors.
The ARM processor supports address translation using an MMU (Memory Manage-
ment Unit). The MMU uses a two-level page table to map virtual to physical addresses.
Each first level page table entry can directly specify a mapping for a 1 MB memory region.
A first level entry may also indirect to a second level page table, which maps memory in
increments of either 16 KB, 4 KB, or 1 KB. Both first level and second level entries include
bits that determine access permissions based on processor mode. The entries also include
bits that determine the caching policy used for the covered virtual memory region.
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Table B.3: ARM interrupt vectors and handling modes
Interrupt Mode Cause Offset
Reset ARM SVC Board is powered on or watchdog reset 0x0
Prefetch Abort ARM ABT An instruction cannot be fetched from
memory
0x4
Data Abort ARM ABT A load or store failed 0x8
Illegal opcode ARM UND An instruction could not be decoded 0xC
SWI ARM SVC Software interrupt 0x10
IRQ ARM IRQ An interrupt has occurred 0x14
FIQ ARM FIQ A fast interrupt has occurred 0x18
The ARMv5 architecture uses a split (Harvard) cache architecture with separate instruc-
tion and data caches. The cache can be disabled, configured for write-through or write-back
for individual pages. An on-chip write buffer can be used to queue writes to memory. It
also includes hardware extensions that support fast context switching without requiring a
cache flush.
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